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INNOVATION OR RENOVATION IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
IS THE WORLD MOVING TOWARD A NEW MODEL OF
ADJUDICATION?
Gerald S. Reamey
A universal system of criminal procedure offers the allure of
efficiency, predictability, and enhanced crime control. For the first
time in modern history, universality seems achievable. The
criminal procedures employed by the world's major legal systems
are converging. What was once distinctively "civil" or "common
law" is now a blend of the two. The adversarial adjudicative
approach of most common law countries now can be found in the
most unlikely places, and civil law characteristics adorn the
processes of some of the world's most aggressively adversarial
systems.
While this movement has not gone unnoticed, the pace of change
has accelerated, and the ways in which it has manifested itself have
increased. This article begins by revealing how little systems
actually differ in practice. It then analyzes how the gap that
remains between these systems is closing by examining three
illustrations of convergence: the growing use of lay judges and
juries in civil law countries, the Italian reform movement
incorporating adversarial techniques in a traditionally
nonadversarial system, and the modernization of Chinese criminal
procedure.
Following, or perhaps leading, this trend are a new breed of
"hybrid" legal systems that borrow from several legal traditions
and invent procedures freely. Beginning with the creation of
multinational and supranational criminal tribunals following the
end of World War II, new institutions and processes have been
developed to deal with regional and international violations.
Among the most important examples of the movement toward
hybridization and multinational adjudication is the Corpus Juris
project. Little known in the United States, this proposal represents
a controversial effort within the European Union to
harmonize-and perhaps to universalize- the criminal processes
relating to protecting the Community's financial interests. Only
some of the recommendations resulting from Corpus Juris have
been instituted, but it nevertheless continues to impact thinking
about unification and reform. Several tribunals already function
with regional and international jurisdiction. The European Court

694

Arizona JournalofInternational& ComparativeLaw

Vol. 27, No.3

of Human Rights, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Court have
somewhat distinctive rules of procedure, but all blend the traditions
of the major legal systems in a slightly different mix.
Will the trend toward adversarial trials and hybrid rules of
adjudication eventually produce, as some have predicted, a
universal system? This article explains not only the influences
propelling countries toward a similar view of criminal procedure,
but also why that movement is inherently limited and unlikely to
produce universality.
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INNOVATION OR RENOVATION IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
IS THE WORLD MOVING TOWARD A NEW MODEL OF
ADJUDICATION?
Gerald S. Reamey*

I. INTRODUCTION
Comparativists for some time have noted that the world's major legal
systems, at least in their broadest characteristics, are becoming less distinctive.]
Casual students of comparative law may continue to describe these systems by
reference to their degrees of adversariness, or to the presence or absence of
2
procedural features, or perhaps to their differing views of sources of law. But
increasingly, the reality is much more difficult to confine within the traditional
parameters.

3

. Professor of Law and Co-Director of International Legal Programs, St. Mary's University
School of Law. I was assisted in researching this article by St. Mary's law students
Cassandra Charles, Andrew Skemp, Pim Skulkaew, Matthew Ort, and Megan Schad. Very
helpful comments, contributions and critiques were provided by my St. Mary's colleagues
Michael Ariens, Dorie Klein, and Gary Liu, and by my favorite lawyer, Kay Reamey. This
work, and my interest in this field, was inspired by many conversations with my very good
friend and sometime co-teacher, Professor Frank Hoepfel of the University of Vienna. His
comments on drafts of the article provided the perspective of an academic schooled in a
different legal tradition that every comparative work needs. While I am truly grateful for
the essential help I received from each of these talented people, they share none of the
responsibility for the views I express.
'See, e.g., RUDOLPH B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 31 (5th ed. 1988); DAVID

LUBAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 136 (2010); Vincenzo
Ferrari, Law and Society Studies andLegal Education, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 495,498-99.
2See generally, SCHLESINGER ET. AL., supra note 1, at 229-525 (comparing common and
civil law methods and sources); MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL
TRADITIONS INA NUTSHELL (2d ed. 1999) (comparing "civil law traditions" and "common
law traditions"); Maximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The
Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure,
45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 7-26 (2004) (discussing different approaches to the adversarial and
inquisitorial legal systems).
3
This confusion is reflected in Professor Pizzi's difficulty defining the difference in
American and Continental European trial systems:
When some respected judge or trial attorney gives a lecture at my law
school and announces with fervor that "ours is an adversary system,"
confident that he or she has expressed some obvious and basic truth
about our American legal system, I nod in agreement like the rest of the
audience. But deep down I do not understand the distinction being
drawn and what is supposed to separate the American trial system, and
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It is not entirely clear, for instance, why criminal procedures in European
courts seem to be growing more similar to those in the United States. At the same
time, Mexican criminal trials look very different from ones in Germany or Italy,
even though those countries share a common legal heritage with Mexico. Perhaps
the explanation lies in the increasing access to information; a variation on the
"world is shrinking" view that people previously separated by geography, culture,
and cumbersome communication will affect each other more rapidly as they have
Or, it may be that new political and-more
more contacts.
importantly-economic and trade alliances are pushing societies to "harmonize"
in the interest of efficiency and productivity. 4 Whatever the explanations, it is at
least demonstrable that in important ways, and at a rate well in excess of the usual
pace of evolution in law, the understanding of what defines a "legal system" is
changing.5
"Convergence" is the word often used to describe this change, and
indeed, there has been a noticeable tendency in reform efforts to look outside the
traditional processes of one's own legal system and incorporate features borrowed
from other forms.6 This has resulted in "civil law" countries adopting certain
"common law" procedures, and "common law" countries departing from the
methods usually associated with the common law system. As examples
accumulate of nations moving toward a common, hybridized view of criminal
procedure, it is important to investigate some of the reasons for this
reform-which sometimes is quite radical-and to consider the ways in which
these reforms are being applied.
In this article, I describe first what people know, or think they know,
about the traditional order 7 before demonstrating that for a long time the
differences in the criminal procedures of the major legal systems have not been as

presumably the English system, from other western trial systems. The
world that seems black and white to others seems to be only gradations
of gray to me: some dark, some light, but all shades of gray.
William T. Pizzi, The American "Adversary System"?, 100 W. VA. L. REv. 847, 847
(1998).
4See Emma Phillips, The War on Civil Law? The Common Law as a Proxy For the Global
Ambition of Law and Economics, 24 Wis. INT'L L.J. 915, 917 (2007) (noting that "the
contest between civil law and common law can be seen as a proxy for an ideologically

informed debate about the purpose of law in state formation and the flow of capital, and the
regulation of markets"). For an example of an effort to harmonize a body of law within the
European Union, see Bernhard A. Koch, The "European Group on Tort Law" and its
"PrinciplesofEuropean Tort Law", 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 189 (2005).
5
See Colin B. Picker, International Law's Mixed Heritage: A Common/Civil Law
Jurisdiction,41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1083, 1094 (2008) (discussing whether classical

characteristics of legal systems are fading or spreading).
6
See LUBAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 136.
See infra Part II.
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great as commonly believed.8 Next, I explore a few significant ways in which the
gap between the systems has been narrowing in recent years. To do this, I
consider the increasing use of juries and lay judges in places where lay
participation either has never existed or has not existed for a long time.9 I then
review the extraordinary reform efforts in Italy, breaking with its historical
approach to criminal justice and moving deliberately toward a "middle-ground." 0
Finally, I describe the movement in China away from an entirely different kind of
legal system to one that-at least in principle-is imbued with modern aspects
borrowed from several procedural schemes."
While these changes have been occurring, legal systems have been
developing at the supranational level. In both regional and international tribunals
established for special purposes, whole legal regimes have been created, without
traditions of their own, but borrowing liberally in smorgasbord fashion from
others.12 These examples-the European Court of Human Rights, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and the International
Criminal Court-play an important role in leading or reflecting the hybridization
of criminal procedure.' 3 In this regard, I also review the impact of the European
Union's Corpus Juris project-a possible precursor to a unified system of
criminal procedure for an entire continent of diverse and sovereign nations.
Against this backdrop, I discuss why I think these changes are occurring
and what the prospects are that they will continue and result in adoption of a
universal "third-way" of adjudicating criminal cases. Is this convergence the
result of a deliberate attempt to harmonize and homogenize systems? Is it a
common recognition of a better way to achieve criminal justice? Or is this "trend"
really only a fad or coincidence? The answers to these questions lie not only in
law, but in an understanding of common values, geopolitics, cultural change, the
impact of world markets, and the information revolution.
II. THE PRINCIPAL LEGAL TRADITIONS AS THEY ARE COMMONLY
UNDERSTOOD AND MISUNDERSTOOD
In order to grasp the magnitude and reach of these movements toward
convergence and to speculate about the causes for them, I will revisit the most
4
common characterizations of these systems. The world's major legal systemsl
8 See

infra Part III.
See
infra Part IV.A.
0
See infra Part IV. B.

9

I"
2 See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part V.
3
1 See LUBAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 137 (stating decisions by regional human rights

tribunals "push states in the direction of procedural fairness and recognition of defendants'
rights").
"The use of "major" to describe these systems is entirely my own. Other systems,
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traditionally are divided into three: those in the "common law" tradition; others
(most) in the "civil law" tradition; and a smaller but significant group in the
"communist/socialist" tradition.15" As noted, significant differences exist within
each of these categories.' 6 The English practice common law in a way that is
quite distinct from the version we use in the United States. 17 Among the civil law
countries, some nations employ variations that would be barely recognizable to
others in the same tradition. Not so long ago, with the collapse of the Soviet
Union, China was the leading exemplar of a communist approach to justice. Now,
like Russia, it is a changing legal system with vestiges of the past and sometimes
awkward reform features of the future.
If these differences are set aside and the "major systems" are categorized
by those who have little interest in, and exposure to, the detailed workings of
those systems, the stereotypical characterizations might look like this: those of us
who follow the common law tradition see the decisions of courts, especially
higher appellate courts, as a legitimate source of law. While we also recognize the
legislative branch of government as a creator of law, and while we might even
consider statutes and constitutions to control over "judge-made" law, in the
absence of such conflict, the rules crafted by courts are seen as binding, not just
on lower courts, but on society as a whole.
The English-influenced varieties of common law also share another
important in their own right and often of growing prominence, may deserve a place that I
have not reserved for them in this article. For example, the importance of Islamic law
deserves attention, but I have chosen not to incorporate "religion-based" legal systems
within this analysis because their nature does not allow the same kind of change that
secular systems do. Over time, significant modifications may occur in these systems, but
they do not provide a good barometer for worldwide change due to the tenets upon which
they are founded.
5
1 See LUBAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 135 (stating that the "main distinction" is between
common law tradition and civil law tradition but socialist law tradition also could be
identified); Picker, supra note 5, at 1095 (stating that common law and civil law systems
are in "Western" tradition; others are in the "non-Western"); William Partlett, ReClassifying Russian Law: Mechanisms, Outcomes, and Solutionsfor an Overly Politicized
Field, 2.1 COLUM. J. E. EUR. L. 1, 24 (2008). As Partlett notes, some comparativists have

"written off" communist and socialist systems as insignificant or extinct. Id at 39-41. As I
write this, I can imagine many legal comparativists cringing at my use of any of these
outdated descriptions. I have used the terms precisely because they remain so firmly
associated with a body of notions about differing processes of adjudication that, for my
purposes in this article, they serve as a ready shorthand for a cumbersome conglomeration
of fact and fiction.
6
1 See LUBAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 136.
7
1 John Hatchard, Criminal Procedure in England and Wales, in COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 176, 180 (J. Hatcher, B. Huber & R. Vogler eds., 1996). I am reminded in this
regard of Professor Henry Higgins's lyric in "My Fair Lady" to the effect that English has
not been spoken in America for years. Just as we are two peoples divided by a common
language, our legal systems bear similarities, but with distinctive accents.
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distinguishing characteristic. They all are, to varying degrees, "adversarial" in
their adjudicatory processes. As has been discussed extensively by many capable
comparativists, this feature relegates the common law trial judge to the role of
neutral referee,' 8 rather than an active participant in the gathering of evidence and
its presentation at trial.19 The lawyers (advocates) shape and control the
investigation, accusation, trial, and appeal of the case.
By contrast, the stereotypical civil law system supposedly pays little or
no attention to the decisions of appellate judges in deciding what the law "is."
Law is made by the legislature or the executive; judges read and apply the law,
and perhaps occasionally interpret the law, but only within very limited bounds.
What the judges have to say about the application of the law is of importance only
to the parties; it is of scant concern to other courts within the same system, and of
no formal precedential value.
In adjudication, the civil law judges-usually professionally trained, but
sometimes sitting collegially with lay colleagues-control the trial. 20 Often,
magistrates also play a role in the investigation phase, and may even have
extensive supervisory powers over it.21 Prosecutors in these systems tend to be
relegated to more preliminary tasks and may have relatively little discretionary
authority.22 It is not unusual to find prosecutors and judges functioning within the
same branch of government, in cooperation, and perhaps as interchangeable career
professionals who have never ventured outside this professional track to serve in
other capacities.
Communist legal systems share many of the procedural features of civil
law systems. 23 The overt political control exercised by the state over the criminal
'8See

CHRISTOPH SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

217-18

(2001) (stating that the role of judge in the adversary system is comparable to an "umpire"
in sports contests); Abraham S. Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial
Themes in American Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1009, 1017-18 (1974)

(comparing the roles of lawyers and judges in adversarial and accusatorial proceedings);
Raja D. Roy, Challenges for Juridical Pluralism and Customary Laws of Indigenous
Peoples: The Case of the ChittagongHill Tracts, Bangladesh, 21 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 113, 131 n.40 (2004) ("A typical, if somewhat oversimplified, example of an
'adversarial' system of justice is the English Common Law system where traditional
theories of jurisprudence regard the duties of the judge not to 'inquire into the truth'-as is
done in an 'inquisitorial' system of justice-but to act as a neutral umpire in an
'adversarial' contest between two active parties").
9
0f course, the degree to which the judge is detached or an active participant differs from
country to country and judge to judge. The relative inactivity of the trial judge nevertheless
remains a common feature of adversarial systems, and is usually associated with common
law origins.
20
See SAFFERLING, supra note 18, at 217.
21
See Goldstein, supra note 18, at 1018-19.
22
See id. at 1019 (finding little or no discretion lies with the prosecutor).
23
See John C. Reitz, Doubts About Convergence: PoliticalEconomy as an Impediment to
Globalization, 12 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 139, 156 (2002) (stating that
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justice system distinguishes this kind of legal system from others using the civil
25
law form. 24 Judicial independence may be lacking entirely, or may be
compromised heavily by the perceived needs of the state in service to the
ideological ends it pursues. Seeing the judiciary and indeed the entire criminal
justice mechanism as an arm of state policy results in processes that usually are
detached in practice from the expressed principles embodied in the laws of the
nation. For example, lay assessors sometimes play a prominent role in criminal
trials-a visible acknowledgment of the people's relationship to the
state26 -although the assessors actually have little or no real independence.
Higher courts often have expansive power to "correct" lower court findings seen
as not being in the interest of the state. Lawyers within the system may see their
role, not as protectors of the accused, but as partners in the state's justice
apparatus. And lawmakers, usually members of one dominant political party, can
27
be expected to cooperate with the ruling political elite.
As the leading practitioners of communism have trended toward market
economies and trading alliances with non-communist governments and capitalist
states, hybrid forms of law and procedure have developed to facilitate their
economic needs. 28 Since this is a relatively recent phenomenon, hybrid legal
systems have developed with features inconsistent with the stereotypical model,
even while they retain characteristics rooted in the more "pure" communist
ideology of the past.29 This, of course, provides comparativists with a virtual
laboratory in which these experiments may be observed. In some cases,
comparativist scholars are themselves called upon to help governments shape their

Russian law more strongly influenced by Continental civil law than by American-based
common law).
24See Ira Belkin, China, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 92 (Craig
Bradley, ed., 2d ed. 2007) (finding that the "Chinese judicial system is embedded in a
political system that does not tolerate challenges to the authority of the Chinese Communist
Party" and that the "courts are not independent").
25

See id

26

See id. at 104 (noting that the "people assessor system developed during Maoist era as a
way to bring justice closer to the common people").
27
Although these features usually do exist within an ideologically motivated legal system,
they also may be prevalent in states with autocratic forms of government or totalitarian
regimes.

28
See Wendy N. Duong, Ghetto'ing Workers with Hi-tech: Exploring Regulatory Solutions
for the Effect of Artificial Intelligence on "Third World" Foreign Direct Investment, 22
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 63, 132 n.279 ("Take the most fundamental example: the law of

contract in Vietnam rests on principles that do not always parallel contract common law as
we know it in the U.S. Nor is the contract law of Vietnam purely based on a civil-code
system like many European countries. Vietnamese contract law is somewhat a hybrid
creature-somewhere between a code of morality, social flexibility and remnants of a
economic and political system."); Partlett, supra note 15, at 49.
communist
29
See Partlett,supra note 15, at 49.
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systems to meet new needs.30
In addition to rather commonly recognized legal traditions, one more
kind of "legal system" must be added.3 ' This is the ad hoc development of
criminal processes designed and adopted by the various international criminal
tribunals.3 2 These invented systems, taking their cues from the Nuremberg War
Crimes Tribunal, employ a mix of features borrowed from adversarial and nonadversarial systems,3 cobbled together to serve the peculiar requirements of
courts with mixed-nationality benches, advocates, and parties, and dealing with
crimes defined by international law rather than a legislative body. These, too, test
new combinations of old processes-and sometimes new processes-in a public
forum, arguably one that is detached from the overpowering influence of any
single state's culture, language, politics, or legal tradition.

III. Things Aren't What They Seem: Why Legal Systems Are More Alike
Than Usually Believed
A. Sources of law
These generalizations about legal systems are too often inaccurate,
misleading, or at least overstated. 34 While this criticism is justified, there are
30

See Mathias M. Siems, Legal Originality, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 147, 151 (2008)
(Eng.) (stating that comparativist scholars do not merely compare different approaches;
they make policy recommendations based on comparisons). Consultants may influence
change in the direction of the systems they represent. When American lawyers and judges
advise emerging democracies, for example, they are likely to counsel adoption of
rocedures with which they are familiar.
This "system" can scarcely be called that. It is more accurately a collection of variants
and combinations. See Mark A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and InternationalLaw, 13
J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 477, 479 (2007) (stating that "[t]he system of international criminal
law is relatively new and its development has been disjointed as we have had a variety of
ad hoc international tribunals, the International Criminal Court (ICC), national approaches
and a range of hybrid tribunals").
32
See Patricia M. Wald, InternationalCriminal Courts - A Stormy Adolescence, 46 VA. J.
INT'L L. 319, 337-39 (2006) (discussing how hybrid tribunals "represent one powerful
model through which national and international legal systems are communicating and
influencing one another"); Picker, supra note 5, at 1087-88.
33
See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, 30A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 6360 (1st ed.
2010) (stating that the Nuremberg tribunal employed a hybrid procedure); Picker, supra
note 5, at 1087-88 (stating that the mixed processes of ICTY and ICTR have caused
?roblems, and ICC may experience similar difficulties).
4See, e.g., Pizzi, supra note 3, at 847; Phillips, supra note 4, at 922; Mirjan Damaska,
Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480, 481
(1975).
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other, less-often repeated observations that demonstrate how much narrower the
gap actually is between supposedly distinguishing characteristics.
Even the most disengaged American can scarcely avoid hearing public
35
political figures decrying "activist judges" and "legislating from the bench."
Those same politicians would identify the American legal system as a "common
law system" formed in the English tradition. The inconsistency of calling, on the
one hand, for a very limited role for judges and, on the other hand, applying a
label that incorporates the view of judges as rule-makers and a legitimate source
of law, seems to be lost on many observers. This misunderstanding of the
essential nature of common law judging does highlight, however, the current view
and reflects the diminished role that judge-made law is seen to have in the
development of law, even within in the United States.
Statutes now play a dominant part in law creation. 36 American judges,
often to the surprise of Europeans, rarely craft entirely new legal doctrine, and
37
probably do not see themselves as having that responsibility. To the extent that
38
American judges "make" law, it is more likely to involve the interpretation of
statutes. If that interpretation is by a higher appellate court, it has precedential
effect and binds lower courts within the same jurisdiction. It is in this limited
realm that the American "common law" judge "makes" law, and not in the free39
wheeling fashion some may imagine.
35

See Larry V. Starcher, A Judicial Philosophy: People-OrientedJustice, 111 W. VA. L.
REV. 411, 452 (2009) ("After three decades of hearing these arguments, my conclusion is,
if you agree with my interpretation of a statute or constitutional provision, I am a 'strict
constructionist.' If you disagree with my interpretation, I'm an 'activist judge' legislating
from the bench! Take your pick!"); Keenan D. Kmeic, The Origin and Current Meanings
of "JudicialActivism, " 92 CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1442-43 (2004) (explaining that in the past
few years, politicians and media pundits have issued harsh rhetoric condemning so-called
"activist judges" for "legislating from the bench").
36

See Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of the Modern
State: Keep the Bathwater, but Throw out That Baby, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 309, 358 (2002)
(Noting that "[i]t would be useful and illuminating to develop a body of scholarship that
counsels legislators about the design and drafting of statutes given the dominant role of
statutes in the modem state. The failure of scholars to do so thus far is partially attributable
to the juro-centrisim of legal scholarship . . . .").
37
See Matthew Weisberg, Hon. John RichardPadova Senior U.S. District Judge, Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, 56-MAY FED. LAw. 26, 27 ("The judge is not inclined to give his

judicial philosophy a label, matter-of-factly stating that trial judges in most matters do not
really have the opportunity to 'make new law."').
38
With respect to criminal law, many states in the United States have completely abandoned
common law crimes, and require that offenses be defined by statute. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 1.03(a) (West 2003).
39
See Jill Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for
Corporate Charters,68 U. CiN. L. REv. 1061, 1072-73 (2000) (stating that "[judge-made
law is generally more stable and consistent than legislation, which is affected by politics,
and that courts are limited in the scope of the changes they can effect by the nature of the
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Even the English judge-the quintessential common law figure-plays a
secondary role in making law. The English Parliament is considered the primary
law-making body, with judges playing a much more restricted part.4 0 Statutes
control and expand in influence; judge-made law shrinks in importance.
But is it not much the same in the civil law? In a legal regime in which
codes, and only codes, are considered to be law, 4 1 do the decisions of courts have
no force? Actually, they do have considerable importance. Obviously, the parties
are affected by these rulings. From their perspective, the trial judge who
interprets a code, even incorrectly, has made "law," at least for them. More
broadly, the decision of a country's supreme court or constitutional court is
viewed with interest by lower court judges and practitioners because it permits the
legal actors and society in general to predict what the result is likely to be in a
similar case. 42
The decision of a civil law court may not be seen as binding precedent on
lower courts, or even on the court rendering the decision-as, indeed, it is not,
strictly speaking, in the United StateS4 3 -but it would be overstatement to assert
cases brought before them").
4'See Abbott v. The Queen [1977] A.C. 755, 767 (appeal taken from Trin. and Tabago)
("Judges have no power to create new criminal offences; nor in their Lordships' opinion for
the reasons already stated, have they the power to invent a new defence to murder which is
entirely contrary to fundamental legal doctrine accepted for hundreds of years without
question. If a policy change of such a fundamental nature were to be made it could, in their
Lordships' view, be made only by Parliament. Whilst their Lordships' strongly uphold the
right and indeed the duty of the judges to adapt and develop the principles of the common
law in an orderly fashion they are equally opposed to any usurpation by the courts of the
functions of Parliament."); Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd. v. Director
of Public Prosecutions, [1973] A.C. 435, 464-65 (holding that courts no longer have the
power to make criminal law, but where parliament has not legislated, the courts are free to
continue enforcing common law).
41
See Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, Case Law Versus Statute Law: An
Evolutionary Comparison, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 382 (2008) (stating that civil law
sistems are characterized by their reliance on legislation instead ofjudge-made law).
See Jeffrey G. Miller, A GenerationalHistory of Environmental Law and its Grand
Themes: A near Decade of Garrison Lectures, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 501, 512 (2002)
("Most of the world's legal systems are code systems, not common law systems, and do not

adhere to the stare decisis use of precedent as does the Anglo-American common law
system. That does not mean they are without jurisprudence or legal doctrine"); Eu Jin
Chua, The Laws of the People's Republic of China: An Introductionfor International
Investors, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 133, 136 (2006) (stating that since China is a civil law system,
prior cases have no binding effect; however, due to an increase in foreign litigants, some
provincial judges are writing their decisions with more legal analysis to provide better
guidance for legal practitioners); PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING
WORLD 262 (2007).

law courts always retain the power to overrule prior decisions. The principle of
stare decisis imposes a systemic respect for precedent, even when those earlier opinions
have become suspect or reflect thinking that is no longer in vogue. An example of this can
43Common

704

Arizona JournalofInternational& ComparativeLaw

Vol. 27, No.3

2010

that the opinion has no influence on the application of the law. In a civil service
system in which advancement through the ranks of the judiciary is determined in
part by a judge's ability to avoid excessive reversals by higher courts, it would be
surprising if the views of the highest-level judges were not followed closely by the
trial courts." Consistency is a necessary goal of any legal system that seeks
legitimacy. Random and entirely ad hoc rulings quickly undermine the
confidence of a people in their courts and are not likely to be tolerated. This
notion of predictability is, in American courts, advanced by deference to
precedent (or stare decisis), generally understood to mean that the previous
opinions of a given court should be followed and, further, that lower courts should
follow the legal decisions of higher courts.
Isn't the ruling of an American court " law" with respect at least to lower
courts? While one might say quite correctly that the decision of an intermediate
state appellate court is "binding" precedent on trial courts within its jurisdiction,
that decision usually has no binding effect on trial courts in areas of the state that
may fall under the jurisdiction of a different intermediate appellate court with a
conflicting view or no expressed view. The decision is perhaps persuasive
authority in that other region, but only in the way a civil law appellate court's
opinion would be persuasive. And even the trial courts subject to the jurisdiction
of the deciding court may distinguish the higher court's opinion or find other ways
to avoid the strict application of its ruling. The highest-level appellate court in the
state can, if asked, overrule what briefly was "law" announced by a lower
appellate court, but the state high court's decision is not safe from statutory
modification or, in some cases, review and reversal by a federal court.
be seen in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 430 (2000), a decision in which Chief

Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the majority, labels the rule of Miranda v. Arizona
constitutionally-based. That decision depended in large part on the fact that Miranda had
been the recognized rule for many years and its famous warnings have "become embedded
in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national
culture." Id. at 430. As the Court noted, "Even in constitutional cases, stare decisis carries
such persuasive force that the Court has always required a departure from precedent to be
supported by some special justification." Id. at 429. In spite of this reluctance to tinker
with what their predecessors have done, common law appellate judges sometimes feel
compelled to refine, modify, or even abandon earlier iterations of the law. See, e.g., Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"See Allen Shoenberger, Change in the European Civil Law Systems: Infiltration of the
Anglo-American Case Law System ofPrecedentinto the Civil Law System, 55 Loy. L. REv.

5, 5-6 (2009) ("In one of the discussions with a justice of the Italian Supreme Court, the
justice stated that if an Italian judge in a lower court ignored a decision of his court without
explaining why (or distinguishing it) that judge might be subject to judicial discipline under
the Italian system! In another discussion at the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg,
an Advocate General for the Court (a position that corresponds to the Solicitor General of
the United States) stated that prior cases decided by the court are not technically precedent;
however, the principles within the prior decisions must be followed by national courts (i.e.
the courts of the 27 nation states in the European Union).).
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Ultimately, American courts do make law, but only in a limited sense.
The divide between common law and civil law looms larger in characterization
than in reality with respect to sources of law. It is more a matter of degree than a
difference in kind.45

B. Means of Adjudication
Perhaps, as some have suggested, the difference lies not in the role of
codes versus opinions, but in the means by which disputes are adjudicated." If
the American and British systems, and those common law systems they have
influenced, are inherently adversarial in nature, and the civil law countries employ
a non-adversarial approach, that distinction may be sharper and more meaningful
than the sources of law. Even here, however, the differences-while real-are not
as vast as imagined.4 7
The most casual observer could not fail to notice that in an American or
English trial, the lawyers are more active than the judges. They decide on the
theory of the client's case and how it will be presented. If the case is to be tried
by a jury, the lawyers will organize the evidence and formulate their questions in a
way that is easiest for the jurors to understand, and most effective in shaping the
way the jurors will view the evidence. The trial court judge sits mute while the
questioning is conducted by the lawyers, afraid to interject the obvious unasked
question or to make the most innocuous remark for fear that a reviewing court will
consider the judge's participation to be an inappropriate comment on the evidence
tainting the supposed neutrality of the jury. 48
Indeed, the American trial lawyer, particularly in a state court, will use
all of the available procedural devices in order to produce from a larger body of
potential jurors, the group that will be most receptive to his or her presentation.
Either side usually is permitted to take the fact-finding function from the judge
and give it to a jury, leaving the American trial judge with little to do other than
rule on motions and objections, and formulate a jury instruction-subject, of
course, to suggestions and objections from the respective lawyers.
45

There are, of course, significant differences remaining, even if the distinctions are not as
sharp as imagined. See J.R. Spencer, Introduction, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES
27-37 (Mireille Delmas-Marty & J.R. Spencer eds., 2002) (cataloging differences in
English and continental European criminal procedures, particularly in the investigative and
a peal phases).
SAFFERLING, supra note 18, at 207 (2001) (noting that "trial [ without doubt ... [is]
where differences . . . [in] legal traditions are most obvious").
47
See Denis Salas, The Role of the Judge, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES

488, 489
(Mireille Delmas-Marty & J.R. Spencer eds., 2002) (noting the distinction between
accusatorial and inquisitorial systems is outdated and not particularly apposite).
48
See SAFFERLING, supra note 18, at 211 (noting that some see "summing-up" of case as
opportunity to slant the evidence).
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Even if justice might be subverted by the failure of a lawyer to object to
evidence, ask an important question, make a particularly effective argument, or
avoid harmful strategies, the American trial judge sits and watches and listens
without intervening.49 This passive role is made somewhat easier for the judge
because she or he is almost totally ignorant of the evidence that will be presented.
The judge hears the facts when the jurors hear them.
The English judge traditionally has been more active than his American
counterpart.50 In England, judges have been much less reticent to play a more
active role, even in the presence of the jury and despite potential reversal of a
While the
conviction for interventions that might influence the jurors.
examination and cross-examination of witnesses is conducted by the lawyers in a
fashion strongly resembling that used in the United States, there is much less
opportunity for English lawyers to shape the jury through selection strategies. As
in many features of the American method of adjudication, this difference reflects a
fundamental and thorough distrust of government, even as represented by the
relatively benign and independent figure of the judge. 52 Ironically, this divergence
in the American and English procedural forms may be explained by an attitude
about government learned largely from America's colonial experiences with the
English crown.
A trial in a non-adversarial, civil law court appears very different.53 The
lawyers are relegated to the role of minor functionaries throughout the taking of
evidence. They come to modest life in argument about guilt or, more likely,
appropriate punishment. A prosecutor's most important function may be to
recommend a particular disposition. Examination of witnesses by either side in a
criminal trial is often quite limited lest the presiding judge interpret the suggested
49

To the extent that ineffective assistance of counsel claims and rules of professional
responsibility are designed to prevent such failures, they do so, if at all, only after the harm
has been done. Disciplining a poor lawyer provides no remedy for the ill-served defendant,
and ineffective assistance claims are notoriously difficult to win.
soSee SAFFERLING, supra note 18, at 210 (recognizing that English judges have more
rominent roles than their American counterpart, particularly in "summing-up" to the jury).
See David Feldman, England and Wales, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY
149, 188 (C. Bradley, ed., 2d ed. 2007) (noting that "[t]he jury is told to disregard any
indication which the judge might seem to give of his view of the evidence, but the freedom
to comment on evidence allows the judge to "steer" the jury in a particular direction
(although too obvious a steer may lead to reversal on appeal).").
52
Further separating the American state trial judge from the influence of a central
government is the fact that these officials often are popularly elected, sometimes without
political party affiliation. In spite of the independence an American judge enjoys from the
control of other branches of government, the historic vestiges of the colonial period seem
firmly rooted in the national psyche, effectively preventing significant movement away

from the jury or toward more active involvement by the judge.
See generally Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excess in the American CriminalTrial, 67
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 403, 435-38 (1992) (discussing relative lack of zeal of advocates in
civil law courts).
5
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questions as implied criticism of the judge's competence. Barring trial testimony
that is inconsistent with the version of facts related by the witness during the
investigative phase of the prosecution, no one in the courtroom hears the evidence
for the first time at trial. The dossier, carefully compiled by the trial judge from
materials largely obtained under the direction of the prosecutor or an investigating
magistrate prior to trial, and made available in its entirety to the defendant,
constitutes the trial evidence before the trial event occurs. The script is written,
54
edited, and learned by the players well before its production to the public.
There usually is no American or English-style jury in these civil law
proceedings, although lay judges may form a collegial bench with the professional
judge or judges.55 The absence of unguided lay participants obviates the need for
extensive and complicated rules of evidence, most of which are designed to ensure
that jurors do not hear anything unduly prejudicial or unreliable. Since the
professional judge can give hearsay and other questionable forms of evidence the
weight they deserve, and can guide any lay colleague who sits in judgment
alongside him, many evidentiary and procedural rules are simply unnecessary.
There is no time-consuming jury selection process, no problems with
sequestration or jury misconduct, and no need for jury instructions. Judges are
free to seek the truth collaboratively with the lawyers who appear before the court.
All of this presents a conceptual gulf between the adversarial process and
the so-called "inquisitorial" one. Again, however, the reality is less stark. In
England and the United States, as well as other common law countries, the
incidence of jury trials is quite small. 6 Most cases are disposed of by a bench
trial or, far more likely in America, by entry of a negotiated plea of guilt that
negates the entire trial procedure. Rules of evidence still limit what may be
presented to the judge, but hearsay testimony might be introduced in a bench trial
and latitude usually is given to the attorneys because the judge supposedly will
discount any tainted or unreliable evidence.
54

In some countries, like Mexico, there is never any significant public production of the
evidence. Guilt is determined primarily on a written record without the kind of continuous,
public event Americans associate with "trial."
See LUBAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 149-50 (jury trials in criminal cases are far from the
norm in most other legal systems but lay judges are used in some systems).
56 In an important work describing the decline in jury trial in both civil and criminal cases,
Marc Galanter notes that:
From 1962 to 1991, the percentage of trials in criminal cases remained
steady between approximately 13 percent to 15 percent. However,
since 1991, the percentage of trials in criminal cases has steadily
decreased (with the exception of one slight increase of 0.06 percent in
2001): from 12.6 percent in 1991 to less than 4.7 percent in 2002.
Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federaland State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 495 (2004).
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Since jury trials account for such a small percentage of the total number
of criminal dispositions, the opportunity for full adversarial contests is
diminished. It is true that motion practice in anticipation of a trial that may
never occur remains adversarial, as does the discovery process to some degree.
But in the United States, plea bargaining plays such a dominant role in the
resolution of criminal cases that motions may not be filed at all, and even if they
are, the "fight" over them often has more to do with gaining leverage in the plea
negotiation that will take place later, than in the preparation of a case for actual
trial.
Potentially adversarial motions, including those for change of venue,
suppression of evidence, and reduction of bail, may be preempted by pre-trial
diversion and other litigation avoidance techniques. Criminal prosecutions that
result in the accused accepting anger management counseling, restitution and
dismissal, substance abuse classes, or deferred adjudication, either do not require
an aggressively adversarial posture or curtail the usual adversarial progress of a
case through trial and possible appeal. More recent efforts to mediate criminal
cases or employ restorative justice techniques early in the process further limit the
extent to which an American prosecution is fully adversarial.
Discovery, which is routine in countries without an adversarial trial
culture, can be quite contested in America. While the government must disclose
certain materials in its possession to the defense as a matter of due process,
constitutional constraints prevent the disclosure requirement from being truly
reciprocal. Consequently, and in an apparent effort to "level the playing field,"
courts and state legislatures sometimes afford the accused in the United States
very little information about the prosecution's case as a matter of right, leaving the
management to the discretion of trial judges. The result, particularly in cases in
which the resources or willingness of the defendant's lawyer to conduct vigorous
independent investigation of the facts of the case are limited, is a choice of bad
options. Either the defense counsel will negotiate a plea without complete
information about the government's case-effectively buying what the
government is selling, sight unseen-or the lawyer will elect the expensive, timeconsuming, and risky trial, a contest that becomes something of a "trial by
ambush" because the lawyer is less than fully informed.
These peculiar American aspects of the adversarial process have been
lamented,58 but remain largely unchanged. In this respect, the adversarial
character of the American legal system is very unlike the more common, nonadversarial trial used in most of the world. But, this feature ultimately has more to
do with the likelihood of a just result than it does with the degree of adversariness
found in the system. It is not the adversarial model that puts justice at risk; it is
the inappropriate application of that model. In England, rules requiring disclosure
57

The same is true in England, where few cases are actually tried to a jury. See Spencer,

supra note 45, at 18.
58 See generally Kessel, supra note
53.
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of the Crown's evidence operate to prevent the flow of information to the accused
from becoming an adversarial struggle without changing the essential nature of
the trial process, something that also can be seen in American jurisdictions that
have adopted more open disclosure requirements.
IV. CLOSING THE GAP: SOME EXAMPLES OF CONVERGENCE
While there may be less distance between common law and civil law (or
adversarial and non-adversarial) systems than commonly believed, even the
remaining gap appears to be narrowing. Examples of this shift can be seen in such
diverse procedural aspects of these systems as the institution or reinstitution of
juries, shifts in control of the trial process from the judge to or from the lawyers,
implementation of more vigorous direct- and cross-examination, and increased
judicial independence.

A. The Increasing Use of Juries
While Americans would understand the term quite differently, to say that
another country has a "jury" means little more than that it uses lay participants in
the judging of cases. "Jurors" of this type are sometimes called "lay judges" or
"lay assessors," but their role is not the same as the British or American jury. In
these common law countries and others, the lay members of the jury decide the
facts of a case without the direct involvement of the professional judge beyond
receiving the judge's instructions on law orally or in writing. Deliberations are
conducted in closed sessions in a manner that is left largely unexplored. These
systems, perhaps not knowing how better to answer difficult and perplexing
questions of credibility and the like, simply lock away the jurors in a little room
with the ultimate question and instructions that are largely unintelligible to them,
and wait for the untrained citizens, like the Oracle of Delphi, to appear with an
unexplained and unquestioned answer.
Other countries, apparently not trusting lay judges to work without
supervision, incorporate them into a collegial bench, guided by one or more
professional judges. 59 In some cases this approach is an artifact of earlier
experiences with lay participation,60 while for others it is an innovation.61
59

Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ukraine employ some form
of collaborative adjudication. John D. Jackson & Nikolay P. Kovalev, Lay Adjudication
andHuman Rights in Europe, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 83, 95-98 (2006).
6See, e.g., id. at 95-98.

6For a short but illuminating history of the use, disuse, modification, and development of

710

Arizona JournalofInternational& ComparativeLaw

Vol. 27, No. 3

2010

Movements toward or away from increased lay involvement in judging are
revealing on several levels, but the effect these institutions have on adversariness
may be independently significant.
The presence of a jury of any sort does not, by itself, necessitate
adversarial methods. Nevertheless, as has been noted, introducing a lay
adjudicative body in the trial-especially an independent one-changes the
,courtroom dynamic and tends to promote a degree of adversariness. If, for
example, the jury will be "selected" by means that are not entirely random, some
process must be used to sort out how decisions will be made. Lay jurors who do
not deliberate collegially with professional judges are more susceptible to the
influences of less-than-reliable evidence, which leads to concern by the lawyers
that the influence will be improper.62 Consequently, the lawyers will be inclined
to request corrective action by the judge, or to take advantage of the opportunity
to make arguments or introduce evidence that might sway the lay observers in
their favor. Rules of evidence may be expanded to counter these efforts, all of
which creates a more adversarial atmosphere in the trial process.
A number of countries have introduced or re-introduced jurors in their
criminal procedure in recent years, and relatively few have abandoned the
practice. Germany is among those countries with a civil law tradition that uses lay
judges. The twelve-member jury was abolished in Germany in 1924, replaced
by a system of lay judges, sometimes referred to as "honorary judges." 4 In a
model employed by many European countries,65 the lay participants in a German
trial question witnesses, deliberate on guilt, and decide sentences just as their
professional colleagues on the mixed bench. 6 Questions exist about the actual
independence of these lay participants, and care must be taken to avoid giving
them access to the trial dossier that would allow them to prejudge the guilt of the
accused,67 but they nevertheless continue to function to "promote a general
understanding of the administration of criminal justice and strengthen[] public

the jury practice in certain European countries, see generally RICHARD VOGLER, A WORLD
VIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 233-53 (2005).
62 For an interesting exploration of the kind of influence an adversarial advocate may have
on a jury, see generally Annie Cossins, Cross-Examinationin ChildSexual Assault Trials:
Evidentiary Safeguardor an Opportunity to Confuse?, 33 Melb. U. L. Rev. 68 (2009).
63
VOGLER, supra note 61, at 246; VOLKER KREY, GERMAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW 6768 (2009); ANKE FRECKMANN & THOMAS WEGERICH, THE GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM 113-14
(Th. Wilhelmi et al. eds., Ist ed. 1999); Barbara Huber, CriminalProcedure in Germany, in
COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 143 (John Hatchard et al. eds., 1996).
6VOGLER, supra note 61, at 243-44; FRECKMANN & WEGERICH, supra note 63, at 113-14.
65

Jackson & Kovalev, supra note 59 at 96-97.

6

6See FRECKMANN & WEGERICH, supra note 63, at 113 (noting that lay judges have "full
voting rights"); KREY, supra note 63, at 67 ("professional and lay judges cooperate with
equal rights in the decision on ... guilt and . .. sentencing").
OSee KREY, supra note 63, at 68.
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confidence in its independence and fairness." 68
Germany's southern neighbor, Austria, also uses this form of lay judging,
but retains a British or American style jury as well.69 While lay judges, sitting
collegially with professional counterparts, are used in certain felony cases, an
independent eight-person jury decides guilt in the most serious felony cases and in
political cases. 70 This American-style jury hears evidence that is produced during
a trial governed by a three-judge panel of professionals, but the deliberations on
guilt take place outside the presence of the judges. Sentencing is a collaborative
process, with the jurors and the professional judges deciding the matter together.72
The trial itself is conducted in the usual "civil law" or "inquisitorial" fashion, with
the evidence being assembled and introduced by the presiding judge and his
professional colleagues, and not primarily by the lawyers representing the parties.
As in other countries with lay judges or jurors, Austria seeks by this
procedural device to democratize its criminal adjudicative process and to
Austrian law professor
introduce a common language to the proceedings.
Herbert Hausmaninger notes that, "lay participation allows for democratic input in
criminal procedure and helps to keep the process understandable to the public at
large."74 This sentiment is echoed for the German system by Drs. Freckmann and
Wegerich:
The main reason for installing honorary judges in the courts is
that they create a link between the judiciary and the people, and,
due to this, ensure that justice is exercised in a generally
comprehensible way and manner. Honorary judges are regarded
as representatives of the general public and contribute their
specific knowledge about society and their ability to assert
particular interests. It is intended that social views and
experiences of the honorary judges find an expression in the
ruling of the courts. Moreover, professional judges are required
to explain their legal arguments and assessments in a simple and
comprehensive way which honorary judges-just as the
ordinary people-will understand. This is a further check
before the judgment is rendered.
The jury selection process can, of course, encourage or exacerbate
68

See Huber, supra note 63, at 143.

69

Jackson & Kovalev, supra note 59 at 95 (noting that independent juries also exist in
Belgium, Denmark, Malta, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and parts of Switzerland).
70
HERBERT HAUSMANINGER, THE AUSTRIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 191 (2d ed. 2000).
71

Id.
1d
73
1d
74
1d

72

75

FRECKMANN & WEGERICH,

supra note 63, at 113-14.
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adversarial tendencies, even if other non-adversarial features are used in the trial
itself. Not only will opposing counsel be inclined to posture for the prospective
fact-finders during the selection encounter, but he or she will seek to introduce,
sometimes surreptitiously, suggestions about how the evidence should be viewed,
and perhaps even to allude to the evidentiary facts that will be developed. The
mixed bench model avoids this simply by removing any selection process from
the purview of trial counsel; they are presented with judges usually chosen by
appointment well before the trial begins. Similarly, for the Austrian version of the
jury, selection is random and no voir dire or challenge procedure exists.7 it
would seem, therefore, that the political and social benefits of a jury system need
not be tied to a pure adversarial struggle, but may be achieved in part without
doing violence to inquisitorial ideals.77
Whatever impacts jury procedure has on the adversariness one finds in
criminal processes, countries continue to institute or revive jury systems,
including independent juries. Russia, Spain, and Japan, all with civil law legal
traditions, have joined the ranks of those relying in part on lay fact-finders.78
Argentina only recently has begun to implement a mixed-bench jury trial
procedure that existed in its Constitution for many years, while South Korea is
experimenting with an independent jury system.8 0
In a highly publicized return to use of a jury, Japan held its first jury trial
in August of 2009.8 This reform has been called "the most dramatic change to
Japan's criminal justice system since the end of World War II.,,82 Like other
countries returning to a tradition of jury trial, the transition in Japan has not been
without its legal and cultural difficulties.8 3 Korea, in an "enormous change" 84 to
76

See Jackson & Kovalev, supra note 60, at 102 (noting the random selection of jurors used
in Austria).
77
See, e.g., Pizzi, supra note 3, at 849 (noting that Norway, a seemingly "inquisitorial"
country, uses juries without adopting other trappings of the American "adversarial"
system).
7See VOGLER, supra note 61, at 247, 252-57 (noting Spain restored the jury in 1995;
Russia began the process in the mid-1990s and extended its reach to all regions in 2007);
Hiroko Tabuchi & Mark McDonald, In First Return to Japan Court, Jurors Convict and
Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2009, at A4.
79
See Paul Edwards-Kevin, The Emergence of Trial by Jury in Argentina, 11 GoNZ. J. INT'L
L. 1 (2009); Ethan J. Leib, A Comparison of Criminal Jury Decision Rules in Democratic
Countries,5 OHIo ST. J. CRjM. L. 629, 633-34 (2008).
soSee Su Hyun Lee, Justice is Swift for Novice Korean Jurors, N.Y. TIMES, (July 17, 2008),
at A 1l; Leib, supra note 79, at 634.
81
See Tabuchi & McDonald, supra note 78, at A4; Setsuko Kamiya, First Law Judge Trial
Kicks Off in Tokyo: Defendant, 72, Pleads Guilty; Thursday Ruling is Scheduled, The
JAPAN TIMES, Aug. 4, 2009, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgibin/nn20090804al.html.
82

Tabuchi & McDonald, supra note 78, at A4.
See id; Kamiya, supra note 81.

83

84

See Su Hyun Lee, supra note 80.
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its justice system, also has experienced growing pains with its jury experiment.85
Even if the increased use of juries and lay judges does not necessarily say
much about the growth of adversarial characteristics, or establish a clear trend
toward a "middle way," it at least is evidence that strict adherence to the "usual"
adjudicative processes of the inquisitorial model has eroded. Because the
movement from the stereotypical norm is, so far at least, one-sided,
experimental, and differentiated, it is premature to attach much significance to this
phenomenon alone. There are other reforms under way, however, that represent
much more important movement away from the traditional methods of civil law.

B. An Intentional Shift Toward Adversarial Trials-The Italian Example
Italy presents an example of remarkable and deliberate reform from a
traditional civil law, non-adversarial system of criminal procedure to one with
This shift began in 1988, a
distinctively common law, adversarial elements.
relatively short time ago in the universe of law,88 with the passage of legislation,
followed in 1989 by its implementation.
Even minor reforms to procedure law seem to jar the systems in which
they occur. Imagine, then, the upheaval brought about by changes to the
fundamental procedural premises on which a system is built. It is not surprising
that reform of this magnitude generated opposition. In spite of strong resistance,
constitutional changes in 1999 cemented the new Italian model in place. 90
These changes fall in three areas: shifting responsibility for investigation
8

See id.

far, abandonment of law judging appears relatively rare. Countries following the
common law tradition of juries have not shown any strong inclination to move toward the
"other side," although some commentators lament perceived diminution of the institution
through various procedural devices.
87
See Rachel A. Van Cleave, Italy, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 303 (C.
86So

Bradley ed., 2d ed. 2007). Stephen P. Freccero, An Introduction to the New Italian
Criminal Procedure,21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 345, 348-49 (1994); Antoinette Perrodet, The
Italian System, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 348, 368-69 (Mireille Delmas-Marty
& J. R. Spencer eds., 2002).

observation, based on no empirical research, is that the legal profession in the United
States changes at a glacial pace, usually requiring at least a decade to fully employ
significant changes in the usual way of doing business. Appellate review and "fine-tuning"
8My

of those "new" procedures can go on indefinitely. From that perspective, the Italian
reforms are, at best, in their adolescence, and in many important ways, in their infancy.
89
Van Cleave, supra note 87, at 303-49; Freccero, supra note 87, at 348-49.
90
See William T. Pizzi & Mariangela Montagna, The Battle to Establish an Adversarial
Trial System in Italy, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 429, 430-31 (2004) (describing the battles
between the Italian Parliament and Constitutional Court over adherence to the 1989 reform
measures); Van Cleave, supra note 87, at 304; VOGLER, supra note 61, at 170-711.
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from a magistrate to the public prosecutor; enhancing the control of the trial
lawyers at the expense of the judge; 92 and introducing a limited form of plea
This "revolutionary" 94 change left intact many of the traditional
bargaining.
"inquisitorial" procedures, 95 grafting on to the system only these relatively
few-but momentous-modifications.
The impetus for this change is not entirely clear, but involves a
combination of circumstances of history, culture, and political and legal tradition.
It has been suggested that the codes of the fascist period were viewed as overly
authoritarian,96 prompting reforms in the direction of increased guarantees of

MSee

VOGLER, supra note 61, at 168-69. Regarding the abolition of the investigating
magistrate, Vogler notes:
The instruction was abolished entirely and replaced by a "preliminary
investigation", very much on the German 1975 model. The office of
examining magistrate disappeared and the pre-trial is now conducted
under the surveillance of a "pre-trial judge" (giudize per le indagini
preliminari- "gip ") who has almost no investigatory role. All major
procedural steps-for example, searches or pre-trial detention-must
be authorised by the gip and it is the responsibility of the prosecution,
working with the assistance of the judicial police, to collect inculpatory
evidence in all cases.
Id
92See Pizzi & Montagna, supra note 90, at 431. The authors explain that:
[T]he changes in the 1988 Code of Criminal Procedure were only
intended to adopt an adversarial system to the extent that power over
the control of the criminal trial was to be shifted away from the trial
judges and placed squarely on the shoulders of the public prosecutors
and the defense lawyers, who would have the primary responsibility for
presenting evidence and for examining (and cross-examining)
witnesses.
Id.
93
See id. at 437-45 (describing "plea bargaining" and expedited trial processes within 1989
reforms).
94
See id. at 430 (explaining that comparative scholars viewed new Italian code as
"revolutionary"); Ennio Amodio & Eugenio Selvaggi, An AccusatorialSystem in a Civil
Law Country: The 1988 Italian Code of Criminal Procedure,62 TEMP. L. REv. 1211, 1211
(1989) (stating that the new Italian code was "the most outstanding event in the 20
Century" for comparativists).
95
See Pizzi & Montagna, supra note 90, at 465 (stating that Italy wants to protect
adversarial values while it retains features of its civil law heritage); VOGLER, supra note 61,
at 171 (noting that "significant residues of inquisitorial practice were still present").
96
VOGLER, supra note 61, at 168; See Freccero, supra note 87, at 346-47; Amodio &
Selvaggi, supra note 94, at 1224 (explaining that reforms reflect need to compensate parties
for power denied them by dominant decisionmaker).
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openness and efficiency, and away from rampant formalism.97 Richard Vogler
has suggested that increased American political and ideological influences
following World War II contributed to the interest in an adversarial trial model.98
Perhaps this interest was sparked in part by the hybrid model on display at the
Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, or in the many romanticized examples depicted in
American movies. 99 Whatever the causes, reform efforts began in Italy shortly
after World War II, culminating in the 1988 legislation. 10
Italian prosecutors and defense lawyers now call witnesses and examine
and cross-examine them, a job previously left almost entirely to the presiding
judge. 0 ' Instead of giving the judge access to a dossier filled with the results of
the investigation,102 the lawyers develop the evidence at trial under rules of
evidence that were not necessary in the old system of judge-dominated
presentation. o0 The trial judge is relegated to a role more like a co-participant,
having the authority to call witnesses and question them, but only to the extent the
parties omit significant evidence.1o4 Professors Amodio and Selvaggi describe the
trial process under the new code in this way:
[T]he trial structure exhibits the most peculiar features of the
adversary pattern. Following the opening speech about case
presentation and motions to admit proof, both the prosecutor
and the counsel for the defendant produce the evidence for their
cases through direct and cross-examination of witnesses,
experts, and the defendant himself. The examination of
evidence may look simpler than that deeply rooted in the AngloAmerican tradition. But the new Code retains the fundamental
adversary character of the latter-the prosecution's evidence
(prove a carico) is distinguished from exculpatory evidence
(prove a discarico). The burden of introducing evidence as well
as the burden of persuasion have become the cornerstones of the

97

See Van Cleave, supra note 87, at 303; VOGLER, supra note 61, at 168.
supra note 61, at 168.
"See id. at 157 (stating that the global resurgence in adversariality was driven by U.S.
hegemony and "ideological influence symbolized by the Hollywood courtroom drama").
98VOGLER,

1

' See id. at 168.
'o'See id at 169; V. CIRESE & V. BERTUCCI, THE NEW ITALIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR
FOREIGN JURISTS 161-62, 178 (2d ed. 1993).
"1SeeVan Cleave, supra note 87, at 303 (explaining that judge receives a "doppio" or
limited dossierwith much less material than previously available).
103See VOGLER, supra, note 61, at 170; Van Cleave, supra note 87, at 303. This procedure
has converted the Italian trial from its previous, inquisitorial form. It is, as two authors
have stated, "no longer a trial on evidence, but a trial for evidence." CIRESE, supra note
101, at 161.
104Amodio & Selvaggi, supra note 94, at 1221.
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new Italian system of criminal justice.105
This shift in emphasis under the 1988 code is described by professors
Pizzi and Montagna as placing the trial, rather than the investigative stage and the
dossier it produced, at the "heart of the system" in which "the two contending
parties were to produce the evidence and test the evidence at trial." 0 6 To ensure
that the trial judge had no more than limited access to information about the case
before it was tried, 0 7 the reforms require a different judge to supervise the
investigation phase than the one who presides over the trial.'0o
Not every aspect of the Italian trial will look familiar to the AngloAmerican lawyer. As noted, the Italian judge may call witnesses and may
examine witnesses called by the parties. '0 While the latter may sometimes be
seen in English courts, and even in American federal courts and those of some
states, it is rather uncommon for state trial judges in the United States to engage in
more than the most cursory and occasional questioning of a witness for fear that
their questions will be misinterpreted by, or improperly influence, the jury.
This does not pose the same impediment in the Italian trial where
professional judges sit collegially with lay judges in the German style, at least for
the most serious crimes in the Corte di Assise.110 Lower level trial courts, the
Tribunale and Giudice di Pace, do not employ a mixed bench, thereby avoiding
the problem altogether."'
While the introduction of adversarial procedure into the trial stage has
perhaps made "criminal trials more consistent with the democratic principles of
orality, immediacy, and publicity,"ll 2 it also has introduced the kind of
inefficiency and delay that one would expect from a process dominated by
opposing counsel rather than the judge." 3 This, in turn, led to the institution of
abbreviated trial procedures not entirely unlike those found in the American

'osId. at 1220-21 (italicization added).
'1Pizzi & Montagna, supra note 91, at 435.
07

See Guilio Illuminati, The Frustrated Turn to Adversarial Procedure in Italy (Italian
CriminalProcedureCode of 1988), 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 567, 571-72 (2005)
(explaining that the "double dossier-system used to avoid corruption of trial judge's "virgin
mind").
' 0 Pizzi & Montagna, supra note 90, at 435-36.
'11Amodio & Selvaggi, supra note 94, at 1221; see also Pizzi & Montagna, supra note 81,
at 436-37; CIRESE, supra note 101, at 177 (stating that the trial judge has power to summon
witnesses).
0
Two professional judges sit in combination with six lay judges in the Corte di Assise, the
trial court responsible for offenses that usually carry lengthy prison sentences. CIRESE,
supra note 101, at 24-25.
"Id. at 23.
2
1l See Van Cleave, supra note 87, at 303.
"3See Illuminati, supra note 107, at 578 (explaining that the accusatorial-adversarial
system is time-consuming and expensive, demanding a duplication of activities).
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practice of plea-bargaining.1 4 As noted by Rachel Van Cleave in her description
of this result, it is ironic that the less democratic practice was necessitated by the
more democratic reform." 5
While the Italian version of plea-bargaining is very limited in comparison
with its free-wheeling American counterpart, it nevertheless remains the "most
important novelty in the new code."ll 6 To understand why plea-bargaining is
viewed as novel in Italy, one need look no further than the strong-judge/weakparty model usually characteristic of Continental, inquisitorial systems. Pleabargaining, by contrast, is essentially the placing of control over the issues of guilt
and sentencing of the accused in the hands of the lawyers. It runs directly counter
to the inquisitorial tradition of leaving such matters to the professional judges,
acting either alone or collegially with lay judges.
Italy has softened the impact of its reforms on this tradition by retaining
in the judge ultimate power to control and accept or reject any proposed
arrangement reached by the parties." 7 Also, the Italian model does not
encompass, as does American plea-bargaining, what is known as "charge
bargaining.""8

Only reductions in sentence are possible.

Abbreviated or

alternative trials are available for less serious offenses, but not for more serious
ones, and only with the collaboration of the judge.I 9 The procedure code
specifies the circumstances under which the accused is entitled to use one of these
devices, and the prosecutor lacks the authority to "not bargain" if the accused
desires it and the judge determines that an alternative to trial is preferable. 120
Because plea-bargaining is so deeply inconsistent with the foundational
principles of inquisitorial or non-adversarial legal systems, it is truly remarkable
that any form of the practice exists within a procedure that remains rooted in that
tradition. As Pizzi and Montagna explain:
Plea bargaining would be a challenge to any country with a civil
law heritage. It is not surprising that Italy has only approached
the topic gradually and that the Italian system is trying hard to
soften the challenge that plea bargaining makes to the principle
il4See Van Cleave, supra note 87, at 304 (concluding that democratic reforms made trials
"more complicated and time-consuming).
"'See id. at 303.
"6 CIRESE, supra note 101, at 223
1 See Pizzi & Montagna, supra note 90, at 443-44 (noting that ultimate control in the judge
preserves judicial independence).
' JENIA 1.TURNER, PLEA BARGAINING ACROSs BORDERS 273 (Hiram E. Chodosh ed. 2009).
" 9See id. at 142 n.22 (noting that plea bargaining available only for crimes with a sentence

up to ten years).
0

pizzi & Montagna, supra note 90, at 440-43 (stating that the trial judge retains control
and can accept proposed bargain despite prosecutor's rejection). This is understandable in
light of the typical rule of "mandatory prosecution" found in many European countries. See
id. at 440-41.
12
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that similar defendants should be treated similarly as well as to
the independent authority of the trial judge to see that the
sentence of the defendant is adequate for the crime in question.
To date . . . 85 percent of all criminal cases go to trial. This, of

course, contrasts sharply with the U.S. criminal justice system
where the plea bargaining rate is over 90 percent in most

jurisdictions.121
Although Italy's experiment in plea-bargaining has proven challenging
and not altogether successful, it nevertheless has been influential. European
countries, inspired by the Italian example and others, have begun to adopt the
practice for the same reasons: efficiency and reduction of delays and costs,
22
especially those associated with, or caused by, other procedural reforms.1
Russia and Bulgaria, for example, have adopted plea-bargaining procedures
modeled on the Italian experience.123
Even Germany has begun to employ an informal kind of negotiation, one
that is wholly outside the long-standing formal prohibition on plea bargaining.124
This practice has developed more as a matter of convenience and flexibility, rather
than as part of an overt reform effort, and it is not modeled expressly on the
practices of any particular country.125 One author has referred to the spread of
plea-bargaining over the past three decades as a "quiet revolution," 26 that
"illustrates several different ways in which criminal procedure practices in
different legal systems can converge." 27
The convergence of European legal systems, and the institution of
procedures within those systems bearing closer resemblance to features of the
Anglo-American system, is significant, but not shocking. After all, in a world in
which there is instantaneous communication, frequent and rapid intercontinental
transportation, cross-pollination of economies, ideas, and cultures, the rise of
English as a universal second-language, and the development of large
multinational trading blocs, it is hardly surprising that Starbucks competes in
Vienna with traditional cafes, or that Fiat has acquired a sizable, and potentially a
majority, stake in Chrysler. The extension of these influences into law and legal
systems seems inevitable. The reach of this realignment to such diverse regions as
Latin America and China illustrates how pervasive this trend toward a "third way"
has become.
Without much fanfare, Latin America has shifted quite remarkably in the
12 'Id, at 444-45.

e.g., TURNER, supra note 118, at 138-42 (noting Russia considered plea bargaining
to address costly reforms toward more adversarial proceedings).
123See id. at 142, 160.
124See id. at 73-129.
125See id. at 73.
126Id. at 1.
127TURNER, supra note 118, at 271.
122See,
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direction of accusatorial procedure within the past decade. 128 Richard Vogler
notes that, "Compared with the deeply contested and protracted reform process in
western Europe, the impact of adversariality on Latin America, at least at the level
of procedural reform, has been little short of explosive."l 29 All but a handful of
countries in South and Central America have introduced a new "accusatorial"
code over the past fifteen years.' 3 0

C. Bridging a Very Lar2e Gap-A Chinese System with Western
Characteristics
The movement has begun in China as well. This level of systemic
reform is all the more remarkable, given that the country's roots are communist
rather than a Euro-centric civil law tradition. If it is true that the reform trends in
Latin America have been motivated by "largely financial" considerations,'3 1 the
shift to a market-based economy in China also must be driving the adoption of
rules and processes that are friendlier to the international community and its
commercial concerns.12 While commerce may not seem, at first blush, to be
128See VOGLER, supra note 61, at 172-75; Maximo Langer, Revolution in Latin American
Criminal Procedure:Difusion of Legal Ideas from the Periphery,55 AM. J. COMP. L. 617
(2007).
129VOGLER, supra note 61, at 172.
130Langer, supra note 128, at 631. Some Mexican states are also reforming their criminal
procedure in the direction of the country's southern and northern neighbors. See Allen
Pursey, Justice in the Rough, A.B.A. J., Jul. 2009, at 44, 49.
13 ]VOGLER, supra note 61, at 172.
132See Wang Zonglai & Hu Bin, China's Reform and Opening-Up andInternationalLaw, 9
CHINESE J. INT'L L. 193, 194 (2010):

Riding the wave of economic globalization, China has
successfully built a socialist market economy and a corresponding legal
system by drawing upon common international practices and the good
experiences of other countries in the light of national circumstances. In
trade and commercial areas, the principle of "giving precedence to
international treaty over domestic law and using international custom as
a standby rule in absence of an applicable rule" has been established,
which has created a sound environment for bringing in foreign
investment, advanced technology and management experience. By

joining the World Trade Organization and other relevant institutions
and acceding to international trade treaties, China has taken advantage
of international economic and trade systems to expand development
and effectively deal with trade disputes. In the recent endeavor to
implement the "Going-out-of-the-country" Strategy, which encourages

Chinese enterprises to expand business overseas, a good understanding
and utilization of international law is undoubtedly an important
linchpin.
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concerned with criminal procedure rules, negative reaction from consumers limits
the ability of global companies to do business with impunity in countries that pay
little heed to human and civil rights, or that do not employ a criminal process that
appears more "fair" and mainstream.
This impetus for reform in China has been attributed by Richard Vogler
to the globalization of trade and the influence of China's trading partners:
The next wave of post-war adversarial reform has resulted in the
almost complete destruction of the concept of 'socialist legality'
in the former Soviet bloc and China. As in Latin America,
change has been rapid and is being accomplished under intense
pressure from the U.S. and western Europe. However, despite
competition from moderate forms of European inquisitionprocess, it is Anglo-American adversariality which has
dominated the reform agenda. This dominance to some extent
reflects the balance of influence amongst the donor countries,
whose national expert groups have each been vocal in
promoting the virtues of their own model systems. 33
As part of the pressure for change, Vogler also cites the Chinese campaign for
WTO membership as moving the country toward due process and the "rule of
law."' 34 The People's Daily credited media exposure of "unjust cases" with
35
providing impetus for reform.
In comparison with the reforms of the Italian and Latin American
systems, those in China are modest. They represent, however, a much more
radical break with tradition, which virtually assures that they will be implemented
more slowly. While the traditional legal culture may slow acceptance of the shift
toward due process and some adversarial characteristics, the power of the central
government to effect and enforce national rule changes should not be
underestimated.
To generalize, criminal procedure in China prior to 1996 was
characterized by a court-controlled process in which defense counsel-when there
was one-played no significant role. The "trial" was an event in which evidence
already assembled by the police, procurator, and court was rarely questioned for
fear of implying criticism of those organs. No presumption of innocence existed

Id. at 194-95.
' 33VOGLER, supra, note 61, at 177.

D4Id
at
35

178.

1 Yearender: Media's Frequent Exposure of Unjust Cases Promotes China's Judicial
ONLINE,
AILY
D
PE O P L E ' s
R e f o r m ,
http://english.people.com.cn/200512/19/print20051219_229034.html (last visited Sept. 2,
2010).
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in any formal expression,136 and the trial usually formalized guilt summarily
before proceeding to the real purpose of the ceremony: sentencing.,37 Decisions
were guided by the needs of the people (government), and lower court decisions
could be reversed or modified for political reasons. Judicial independence did not
exist in any significant degree.' 38
The passage of criminal procedure reforms in 1996 signaled the
introduction of fundamental changes, at least in principle, simultaneously both in
the direction of greater regard for human rights and in more adversarial
processes.' 39 Although the presumption of innocence is not stated directly and
clearly,"4 it is implied by various provisions of the 1996 Criminal Procedure
Law. 141 The judge's role as investigator has been curtailed, and the court's access
to evidence gathered in anticipation of trial has been limited.142 Defendants enjoy
the right to counsel during the investigative phase, and not merely days before
trial as previously had been the case.143 The right to silence has been instituted

36

1 See DANIEL C. K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 279

(2d ed. 2009). Professor Chow describes the pre-1997 environment as follows:
Under the 1979 CPL, many judges were biased in favor of finding guilt
once a case was brought to trial based upon the notion that if the police
and procuratorate had completed their investigation and decided to
bring a public prosecution, then the defendant must be guilty to some
degree. Aggressive police and procuratorates were also known to
intimidate witnesses into confessions of guilt in criminal investigations.
Not only did a presumption of innocence not exist under the 1979 CPL,
many observers in the PRC were known to remark that in reality the
opposite was true: a criminal suspect was usually presumed guilty until
proven innocent.
Id
"'See Belkin, supra note 24, at 105.
138See generally Robert Davidson & Zheng Wang, The Court System in the People's
Republic of China With a Case Study of a Criminal Trial, in COMPARATIVE &
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS (Obi N. I. Ebbe ed., 2d ed. 2000); CHOW,

supra note 136, at 277; Belkin, supra note 24, at 91-106.
1See CHOW, supra note 136, at 280-84.

0
14
Professor Chow refers to it as "nebulous and weak." Id. at 280.
141
See id. at 280 (presumption of innocence embodied in articles 12, 34, and 162 of CPL);

see also Robert Marquand, New for China's Courts: trainedjudges, standardrules, The

Christian Science Monitor (Aug. 16, 2001), http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0816/pls3woap.htm (stating that 1996 reforms included "most importantly" a presumption of
innocence) (last visited Sept. 19, 2010).
142Robert Lancaster & Ding Xiangshun, Addressing the Emergence of Advocacy in the
Chinese Criminal Justice System: A CollaborationBetween a U.S. and a Chinese Law
School, 30 FoRDHAM INT'L L. J. 356, 362 (2007).

143CHOW, supra note 136, at 280-84.
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and is being implemented in at least some provincial courts.'" Defense lawyers,
along with prosecutors, now have the ability to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, while the trial judge plays a more passive role, hearing much of the
evidence for the first time at trial. 145 And very importantly, trial judges have a
degree of independence previously unknown.'
Thirty years of reform, 14 7 however, have not necessarily produced
dramatic change. Acquittal rates, which rose after the institution of reforms in
1996, fell subsequently, leading Professor Daniel C. K. Chow to observe that the
rates "do not indicate whether more guilty or innocent defendants are being
acquitted since the specifics of each case will vary, but they indicate that no
48
extraordinary changes have occurred in the PRC criminal justice system."
It is tempting to hope that improved access to trained lawyers and judges
will lead to realization of the goals embodied within Chinese reforms. This hope
is fueled by a gradual change from judges and lawyers with little or no legal
background' 49 to entry examinations and training in law for judges, prosecutors,
and lawyers, all of which occurred during the time period of criminal procedure
reform. 5 0 It was not until 2007, however, that qualifications approaching those
5
found in most developed countries were required.' ' Nevertheless, it remains
possible to practice law in China without having obtained a college or university
education, and incompetence within the legal profession remains a serious
problem.152
Although increased professionalism and higher qualification standards
may eventually produce an improved adherence to the rule of law within the
criminal justice system, it remains to be seen whether these goals can be achieved

144Right to Silence Debuts in China's Judicial System, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, (Nov. 23,
2000), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200011/23/eng20001123_55901.html.
145See CHOW, supra note 136, at 284 (noting that defense lawyers are now permitted to
introduce evidence); Lancaster, supra note 142, at 369-70 (stating that a judge's
responsibilities have shifted from collecting and evaluating evidence before trial to hearing
and evaluating evidence at trial).
'"Lancaster, supra note 142, at 363.
147CHOw, supranote 136, at 261.
148Id. at 284.
149 See Marquand, supra note 141 ("China's judges have been drawn from a pool of retired
military officers with no legal background"); Belkin, supra note 24, at 103 (stating that
retired military officials with no judicial training were often appointed judges as a reward
for loyal service).
'5oSee generally CHOW, supra note 136, at 228-58. The first national qualifying
examination for lawyers in China was not required until 1986. Id. at 231; Lancaster, supra
note 142, at 363-64.
51
See generally CHOW, supra note 136, at 233-35.
2
IS See id. at 233-35, 253-56; Lancaster, supra note 142, at 364 (stating that professional
licensure requires no legal education, and approximately half of those passing the
qualifying exam have none).
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without further structural change. 1 " Professors Sida Liu and Terence Halliday
recently concluded in this regard that:
[A]wareness of the structural configurations of power that
underlie criminal procedure law in China helps avoid naive
notions that more precise formal law, more training of lawyers
and judges, or more refinement of purely legal institutions will
suffice to produce a criminal procedure law consistent with
154
global norms without reconstruction of the state.
Such pessimism may be premature in a reform regime that is relatively young, but
it also is too soon to declare the reforms successful. The articulation and
codification of these goals, whatever the motivation or likelihood of success,
represent significant change in direction, a direction that in many respects is
consistent with other examples already examined.
V. HYBRID PROCEDURE FORMS-SOMETHING BORROWED, OR
SOMETHING NEW?
These reform efforts in China, Italy, and countries within Latin America
have been ad hoc rather than part of a coordinated international, regional, or
multi-national reconsideration of procedure rules. Whether they are the result of
external pressures or influences, or instead the product of internal, domestic
forces, all of them were initiated by the individual states. Since criminal law and
criminal procedure historically have been among the most localized and
domesticated areas of law, it is not surprising that, while countries may look
outside their borders for inspiration and example, they have been reluctant to cede
any significant measure of autonomy on these issues. 55
The Nuremberg trials conducted at the conclusion of World War II
marked the first modern imposition of international or multi-national norms and
procedures by a group of nations to try individuals for crimes perpetrated by the
53
1 Marquand,

supra note 141 (reporting that President Jiang Zemin counseled Senator

Arlen Specter to be patient because the Chinese are "working on the rule of law").
'5Sida Liu & Terence C. Halliday, Recursivity in Legal Change: Lawyers and Reforms of
China'sCriminalProcedureLaw, 34 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 911, 945 (2009).

'ssFor example, some members of the Supreme Court of the United States have expressed
hostility toward consideration of international norms or the laws of other nations in
deciding domestic matters. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 750 (2004)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("We Americans have a method for making the laws that are over
us. We elect representatives to two Houses of Congress, each of which must enact the new
law and present it for the approval of a President, whom we also elect. For over two
decades now, unelected federal judges have been usurping this lawmaking power by
converting what they regard as norms of international law into American law.")
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defendants against their own people.' 5 6 This was a remarkable event, made even
more significant by the Allies' adoption and use of rules of procedure specially
designed for this purpose, and adapted from both accusatorial and inquisitorial
traditions.' 5 7 The procedural rules used, however, were determined in large part
by the nature of the evidence to be offered against the accused, and by the
relatively large numbers of defendants tried in a single proceeding. Because the
Nazi defendants had maintained voluminous and often meticulous records of their
actions, the trials were dominated by written forms of evidence rather than live
witness testimony. Lengthy trials of individuals, which would have frustrated the
people of the victorious nations, were unnecessary due to the nature of the
evidence.
While this seed of multinational adjudication took many years to
germinate, the Nuremberg example eventually sprouted in a variety of forms. Its
legacy includes regional legal regimes, such as that promulgated to enforce the
norms embodied in the European Convention on Human Rights,' 5 8 recent
integration efforts within the European Union (the "E.U." or "Union"), ad hoc
tribunals to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity in the former
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, and most recently, the permanent
International Criminal Court. All of these are independently significant as studies
in supranational enforcement of international or regional norms; collectively, they
signify an influence on, or reflection of, shared procedural practices.' 59

A. The European Court of Human Ri2hts
The Council of Europe in 1950 adopted a declaration of human rights,
"'See LINDA CARTER ET AL., GLOBAL ISSUES IN CRIMINAL LAw 111 (2007) (noting that
Nuremberg and Tokyo trial were first international criminal trials in modem times).
'5See Dianne Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? ConstitutionalCriminal Procedure
in an International Context, 75 IND. L.J. 809, 818-19 (2000) (stating that the London

Charter adopted by the Allies for the trial of Nazi war criminals bridged the divide between
the traditions and amounted to an "international code of criminal procedure"). The Allies
represented a wide spectrum of procedural traditions. Great Britain and the United States
employed variations of the Common Law; France was quintessentially Civil Law; and the
U.S.S.R. followed a socialist/communist form of inquisitorial process. Arriving at an
acceptable common procedure undoubtedly posed a significant obstacle to the institution of
a common tribunal.
158
The procedures used in the Nuremberg IMT have not been replicated exactly in any of
these more recent institutional examples. Its form, which incorporated aspects of both an
adversarial and non-adversarial approach, serves as an example of hybridization only.
Whether one sees the IMT as a predominately adversarial procedure or a non-adversarial
one, the view of international human rights law it spawned has had a lasting impact.
59
I also is extraordinary that, at least in most of these cases, states willingly ceded power
1t
to communal institutions to act as final arbiters of rules and processes that may be
inconsistent with their own legal traditions.
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which includes an enforcement mechanism for violations of the guarantees within
it.'1 The European Court of Human Rights (the "ECHR"), sitting in Strasbourg,
hears complaints of violations by member states, and its rulings are binding on
those members. 16' In effect, European member states treat this judicial body as an
extraterritorial constitutional court with judges who are not necessarily their
citizens, applying laws and procedures that may be very unlike those of the
62
country whose case is being considered.1
The court has proven itself quite successful in adjudicating European
human rights complaints to the satisfaction of the states that are subject to its
rulings. Its influence now extends beyond Europe, and within Europe, beyond the
original Convention itself.163
B. Harmonization or Unification of Criminal Procedure within the
E.U.?-The Corpus Juris Project
The ECHR demonstrates that supranational regimes may be layered over
national legal systems, but it does not establish that countries will voluntarily

abandon their domestic procedures and adopt a new common set in order to
achieve the benefits of universality. The European effort to achieve that more
elusive goal is the "Corpus Juris" project.
Although a multinational European effort to establish regional procedural
rules beyond fundamental human rights was discussed as early as 1977, it was not
until 1995 that the European Parliament commissioned a group of experts to
consider uniform laws and procedural rules for EU member states regarding the
protection of financial interests within the European Community (EC).M The
"See Amann, supra note 157, at 826; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN EUROPE 15 (Richard
Vogler & Barbara Huber eds., 2008) (noting that European Convention on Human Rights
"was given practical application through its own enforcement mechanism involving the
European Commission and the European Court of Human Rights").
6
'1
See Amann, supra note 157, at 828; LUBAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 137 (2010) (noting
that decisions by European Court of Human Rights and other human rights tribunals
sometimes force "modifications in national rules to conform to regional and universal
norms").
162Professor Amann notes that, "through a process that bears resemblance to the
development of a constitutional criminal procedure in the United States, the European court
has established a rule of law that all forty-one states now subject to its jurisdiction must
abide." Amann, supra note 157, at 828.
63
' See id. at 829-30 (noting that "[tlhe Convention's principles matter outside Europe" and
the Court's opinions guide other tribunals and influence other national courts); CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE IN EUROPE, supra note 160, at 15 (explaining that the ECHR "has exercised an

ever-expanding role in the reform and the approximation of criminal procedure in
Europe").
16"EUROPEAN LEGAL AREA PROJECT, CORPUS JURIS: INTRODUCING PENAL PROVISIONS FOR
THE PURPOSE OF THE PROTECTION OF THE FINANCIAL INTERESTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION I
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thrust of the experts' work was to study and propose a set of unifying substantive
crimes and procedures in support of the essentially economic superstructure that is
the heart of the European Union. The product of this effort (referred to as
"Corpus Juris") has been variously described, depending on the perspective of the
observer, but one European commentator summed it up as follows:
The Corpus Juris proposes a model of organized and structured
"verticalization", by laying down a coherent but not exhaustive
system of rules (explicit statement of the text) establishing some
substantive criminal law provisions, concerning common
offences and common general principles which should apply to
them, and some criminal procedure provisions which develop
two basic ideas: the establishment of a European Public
Prosecutor and the principle of European territoriality.165
The language of this statement that the "model" set forth by Corpus Juris
would "verticalize" certain substantive and procedural rules, stands in contrast to
any notion that the experts' proposal was intended as mere "harmonization" or
horizontal integration of the differing codes and traditions within the EU.
"Verticalization" describes a hierarchical, top-down ordering that would require
EU countries to adhere to procedures adopted in Brussels. Contrast with this
scheme the promulgation of a "model" procedure code or set of guidelines
designed, not to impose a single set of rules, but to allow countries to modify their
own systems in ways consistent with, but not necessarily the same as, those of
their neighbors. For instance, if the ALI's Model Penal Code were to be imposed
on all of the United States, that set of crimes would be vertically integrated. But
if-as was the case-the MPC was published merely as a "suggestion" which
states were free to adopt in whole or part, or to ignore completely, it might
influence states to integrate horizontally their disparate criminal codes, or to
harmonize them.
"Harmonization" measures are described in Corpus Juris as those taken
"in order to reduce the most glaring differences between national laws, without
actually going as far as to impose rules that are identical."1 66 The difference in
harmonization of procedure rules, and in the unification of such standards,
occupies a central place in any effort to develop a workable set of processes to
serve an entire global region.
While the United States successfully operates under a dual legal system
intro. (Mireille Delmas-Marty ed., Coleman trans., 1997) [hereinafter

CORPUS

JuRIs];

Amann, supra note 157, at 835-36.
165See Rosaria Sicurella, Towards a EuropeanLegal Area: A Few Guidelinesfor European
Rules of Evidence in Criminal Proceedings, in EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE WITHIN THE EU
AND BEYOND 28 (F. H6pfel & B. Hilber eds., 1997).
'"CORPUS JuRIs, supra note 164, § 3.
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that maintains the sovereignty of "member states" as it recognizes the Federal
Government's right to regulate certain activities affecting the nation, establishing
such a system from a trading confederation of independent countries with diverse
languages, customs, histories, and legal traditions, is a daunting prospect. The
difficulty is increased by realization that creation of EU prosecutors and EU courts
to practice EU procedures in the prosecution of EU crimes "against the financial
interests" of the EU represents not just a ceding of control in a well-defined and
limited sphere of interest, but might easily lead to an expansive, separate criminal
justice system dealing with much more than fraud suspects who flee from Spain to
France. If the Europeans needed an example of how readily "financial interests"
might be affected by virtually any offense, they need look no further than to the
scope of Congress's regulation of "commerce" in the United States and the
growing body of federal criminal law. 6 7
Corpus Juris implicitly recognizes both the political difficulty'6 in
gaining approval for establishment of a central European criminal justice system,
and the inherent advantages in having a unified form of enforcement and
prosecution. Speaking of procedure and evidence rules, Corpus Juris includes the
observation that:
Harmonisation is undoubtedly harder to achieve in this area
given the extreme diversity of national systems. However,
procedure and evidence, even more than the rules of substantive
law, affect the efficiency of the whole of the system. That is
why disparities in this area may lead in practice to impunity
against some, while others have proceedings brought against
them.169
In the end, the experts observed that, "harmonisation, aimed at strengthening
justice and efficiency, contributes to the complexity of the whole."17 0 Adopting
an interesting compromise position, they concluded:
For this reason, we propose a radically new response to the
absurdity, widely condemned but still tolerated, which consists
in opening up borders to criminals whilst closing them to law
enforcement agencies, at the risk of transforming our countries
into havens for crime. This is not a criminal code, nor a unified
167
See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (holding that the Commerce Clause
authorizes federal prohibition of intrastate growing of marijuana).
6
1'
See

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CORPUS JURIS IN THE MEMBER STATES at vi (M.

Delmas-Marty & J.A.E. Vervaele eds. 2000) (noting that the harmonisation of criminal law
and of its procedure remains a politically sensitive topic).
69
' CoRPus JuRis, supra note 164, §3.2.
70
ld. 3 (emphasis omitted).
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code of European criminal procedure made directly applicable
everywhere by European courts set up for the purpose. What
we propose is a set of penal rules, which constitute a kind of
corpus juris, limited to the penal protection of the financial
interests of the European Union, designed to ensure, in a largely
unified European legal area, a fairer, simpler and more efficient
system of repression. .... While there are sometimes areas of
convergence between one national system and another, allowing
the definition of a common law "of confluence", there remain in
many cases divergences which only a common law "of
synthesis" can overcome. And finally the gaps, which are
common in this relatively new area dealing with the protection
of supranational interests, also make it necessary to draw up
what could be termed a common law ofsupplement.171
Protests to the contrary notwithstanding, Corpus Juris does contemplate
a "criminal code" and a "unified code of European criminal procedure made
directly applicable everywhere by European courts set up for the purpose."i72
173
This point has not been lost on critics in, and outside of, the member states.
Their criticism focuses on the establishment of a European public prosecutor, the
possible loss of trial rights (e.g., an independent jury), creation of an investigating
magistrate procedure, and-more generally-the relinquishment of judicial
authority to persons not of the critic's country.174 These concerns are unlikely to
17 iId (emphasis added).
172"Rather than permit national courts to try to accommodate different legal practices,
Corpus Juris would establish one set of laws to govern a select group of crimes, all of
which bring financial harm to the European Union." Amann, supranote 157, at 836-37.
'"See, e.g., CAMPAIGN AGAINST EURO-FEDERALISM, EUROPEAN UNION WANTS TO
INTRODUCE A NEW LEGAL SYSTEM: CORPUS JURIS, http://www.poptel.org.uk/against-

eurofederalism/cj44.htm (arguing against establishment of a European public prosecutor
and centralized investigating magistrate); The European Union Criminal Code That Will
Overthrow Habeas Corpus and Trial by Jury in UK,

HAZNAKERT ONLINE,

Jan. 1, 1999,

http://www.hazankert.com/corpusjuris3.html [hereinafter Overthrow] (noting that "the EU
would become the .. . [single] prosecuting authority in cases of suspected budget fraud,"
acting under its own rules of investigation and trial); Ralph Maddocks, Corpus Juris, LE
QUtBPcois LIBRE, June 12, 1999, http://www.quebecoislibre.org/990612-6.htm (stating
that the European prosecutor would be independent of national authorities and institutions;
trial by jury would disappear; arrests without evidence would be allowed; and, the accused
would be assumed to be guilty).
174See Maddocks, supra note 173; Nile Gardiner & Sally McNamara, The EU Lisbon
Treaty: Gordon Brown Surrenders Britain's Sovereignty, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, at 2

(Mar. 7, 2008), available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/03/The-EULisbon-Treaty-Gordon-Brown-Surrenders-Britains-Sovereignty (stating that the Treaty of
Lisbon would "further erode the legal sovereignty of European nation-states ... [by]
entrenching a pan-European magistracy, . . . a European Public Prosecutor, a federal EU
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be satisfied, and may actually be exacerbated, by the notion that a "common
law"' 7 5 would grow with the implementation of the proposals embodied in Corpus
Juris,or by the overt attempts within the proposed rules to protect the individual
76
interests of the member states.1

Corpus Juris proposes to create a single criminal justice system to deal
with European financial crimes. To accomplish this, it tries to blend existing legal
traditions into a procedural regime that reflects the cultures that would be
subjected to its jurisdiction. 7 7 For instance, rather than urge creation of a central
EU court in the fashion of the European Court of Human Rights, Corpus Juris
contemplates national courts following EU law.' 78 In its Commentary, the Corpus
Juris experts reconcile the procedural rules' 7 9 by noting, "the differences between
the accusatorial and the inquisitorial traditions are smaller than at the preparatory
stage as it is considered everywhere that oral and adversarial proceedings are
paramount during trial.,,180 This observation undoubtedly would be startling to

many European jurists who consider adversarial proceedings to be quite foreign,
and even inconsistent with their "inquisitorial" practices. On the most obvious
trial issue, the use of an independent jury, the proposed rules initially made clear
that "professional judges" must decide cases, and "not simple jurors or lay
magistrates."' 8' This choice, which may have satisfied many within the EU, but
which drew sharp criticism from the English-speaking countries,182 was grounded
on a distrust of "inexperienced people" making important decisions about guilt
police force, . . . and an EU criminal code"); Spencer, supra note 45, at 63 (noting that the

public discussion of the proposal "has been distorted by the violently hostile reaction of the
rifht-wing press" which characterized it as a "federalist plot, hatched in Brussels").
'7 Corpus Juris establishes the "common law" regime explicitly in Art. 26, 4 3:
On application of the general rule on the subsidiary of national law
(Article 35), national courts must refer to the rules in the European
corpus and, if there is a lacuna, apply the national law. They are bound
in all cases to give grounds for the penalty by reference to
circumstances pertaining to the particular case, applying the rules set
out above.
CORPUS JuRIs, supranote 164, art. 26, § 3 (emphasis added).
76
' For example, the investigating magistrate is referred to as the "judge of freedoms" who is
responsible for safeguarding the rights of the person being investigated and is a judge of the
member state's judiciary. Amann, supra note 157, at 837.
77
I at 837 (report proposes a system of investigation and adjudication that would
Id.
combine aspects of accusatorial and inquisitorial methods).
78
CORPUS JURIS, supra note 164, art. 26, § 1.
H9Id. at art. 26, cmt.
1801d

Isd
'811d.

182See, e.g., CAMPAIGN AGAINST EURO-FEDERALISM, supra note 173; Overthrow, supra note
173; Maddocks, supra note 173.
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and innocence.' 83 Because of the controversy it caused in Britain, the proposal
was dropped during a subsequent feasibility review.
However beneficial it would be to establish a regional legal regime with
uniform procedure, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to persuade diverse,
sovereign peoples to abandon long-held and cherished notions of what constitutes
due process in favor of a system cobbled together by compromise.
Harmonization, rather than unification, of processes seems somewhat less
difficult, but it faces many of the same obstacles. German Judge Wolfgang
Schomburg opined on this point that:
An overall-i.e. over and above EU interests-harmonised body
of common European substantive criminal law seems neither
feasible nor desirable given the need to maintain national and
regional particularities. Nor is it possible to forcibly impose
harmonisation of procedural law. Approximation will to some
extent occur of its own accord as a result of competition between
85
the systems and increased cooperation.1
If Judge Schomburg is correct, a degree of harmonization is possible-and even
'83CORPUS JuRIs, supra note 164, at 116-17.
18See Spencer, supra note 45, at 64 (noting that "Corpus IF' eliminated the "professional
judge only" rule for fraud offenses).
'85Wolfgang Schomburg, Are We on the Road to a European Law-Enforcement Area?
InternationalCooperation in Criminal Matters. What Place for Justice?, 8 EUR. J. OF
CRIME, CRIMINAL L. & CRIMINAL JUSTICE 51, 57 (2000). J. R. Spencer explains this

harmonizing effect in this way:
[A] number of . . . developments . . . oblige the Member States to
change their rules of criminal procedure to conform to some common
European norm. Of those that do not, furthermore, a number are likely

to have an indirectly harmonising effect. An example is the proposed
system for mutual recognition of criminal judgments. This was in fact
proposed with a view to enabling diverse criminal justice systems to
work together, and not in order to force them to harmonise their rules.
However, a system under which the criminal courts of one Member
State are obliged to give effect to the decisions of another is unlikely to
work unless each court has faith in the quality of those decisions-and
to ensure this faith, a degree of harmonisation between the procedures
of the different countries may eventually prove necessary. But even
those developments that do not require the Member States to change
their laws will obviously lead to greater contact between lawyers,
policemen, prosecutors and judges from different countries, and, with
it, greater openness to other systems' institutions and ideas.
Spencer, supra note 45, at 60.
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likely because of cooperation in other areas of law and commerce-but immediate
adoption of a supranational procedural regime is unlikely.86
More than a decade after the unveiling of Corpus Juris, only some of its
proposals have been adopted and instituted. There is now a "European arrest
warrant"' 87 applicable throughout the EU, and efforts have been made to extend
88
this initiative to a similar "European evidence warrant" (search warrant).
Discussions regarding uniform standards for protecting the rights of the accused
also have continued,189 but wholesale adoption of the rules proposed in Corpus
Juris has not yet occurred. In public remarks, Franco Frattini, the European
Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security, spoke of the "pressing need for
language and especially legal language which is as far as possible uniform" while
making "allowance for the differences that exist between common law systems,
civil law systems and the other legal systems, sometimes quite distinctive, that
exist in the Far East."'1' In further remarks reminiscent of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, Commissioner Frattini also
asserted: "Mutual recognition is as crucial in criminal matters as it is the case in
civil matters. . . . Mutual recognition implies that Member States' police and

judicial authorities should recognise judicial decisions taken in another Member
9
State as equivalent to their domestic decisions, without any substantial review."' '
While Corpus Juris has not yet produced a full-fledged system of
92
substantive and procedural criminal law, its influence remains considerable.1
The discussions that have surrounded the formulation and implementation of
Corpus Juris, the study in 2001 of the "future of judicial integration in Europe"
that preceded the addition of Eastern European states to the EU,193 and even the
must be noted, however, that the same might have been said of the adoption of a
common currency within the EU, a feat that largely has been accomplished.
1It

87
1 Oreste

Pollicino, EuropeanArrest Warrant and ConstitutionalPrinciplesof the Member
States: A Case Law-Based Outline in the Attempt to Strike the Right Balance Between
InteractingLegal Systems, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1313, 1314 (2008).
88

See Press Release, Franco Frattini, Eur. Comm'r Responsible for Justice, Freedom and

Sec., Remarks at 4th European Jurists Forum: Helping EU Citizens Seize Opportunities:

EU's Policies and Legislation in the Area of Freedom, Security & Justice 4 (May 3, 2007),
t
a
I e
i
I a b
a
a v
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/270&format-HTML
&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en) [hereinafter Frattini Remarks] (last visited
Sept. 19, 2010).
"See id
"See id. at 2.
191Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).
192See VOGLER, supra note 61, at 277 (noting that the creation of universal procedure code,
as in Corpus Juris, "is still exercising its powerful fascination"); SPENCER, supra note 45, at

50-51 (explaining that the pressure to converge runs "both ways," from EU to member
states and from members to the Community).
93
1 See Christine van den Wyngaert, The Protectionof the FinancialInterests of the EU in
the Candidate States: Perspectives on the Future of JudicialIntegration in Europe, 2 ERA
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heated rhetoric in opposition to the creation of a single European legal area,194 all
have contributed to the conception of a workable integration of diverse legal
traditions. 95 It may be impossible to determine whether this on-going debate has
prompted reform efforts in Europe and elsewhere; whether it stands as an example
to others; or whether it is in part the product or beneficiary of such efforts, but
Corpus Juris clearly is a part of a movement to re-think how criminal justice
systems function.

C. The International Criminal Tribunals
Following the work of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals at the end of
World War II, no international body for the prosecution and trial of "war crimes"
or other international criminal conduct existed until the creation in 1993 of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ('ICTY').'" 6 A year
later, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ('ICTR') joined the ICTY as
a special tribunal to address the genocide in Rwanda. 197 Other ad hoc tribunals
have been established more recently to deal with special situations of violation of
international norms.198
The procedural lineage of these courts can be traced to the World War II
tribunals in their employment of a "mixed" or "hybrid" process, borrowing
liberally from the two main legal traditions, but with certain features tailored to
meet the peculiar needs created by the cases they try. Rather than catalog and
available
2001),
(Sep.
2
F 0 R U M
http://ww-w.springerlink.com/content/m44104p2j6725627/fulltext.pdf.

at

' 94See, e.g., CAMPAIGN AGAINST EURO-FEDERALISM, supra note 173; Overthrow, supra note
173; Maddocks, supra note 173; Gardiner & McNamara, supra note 174.
95
1 J. R. Spencer summed up the impact of CorpusJuris in this way:
If nothing ever come of it, the Corpus Juris project is still of interest. It
demonstrates that the different traditions of criminal procedure in

Europe are close enough for a synthesis to be attempted: and this is so
whether (as some believe) the broad future of law of Europe in all
fields is to coalesce in a new ius commune, or whether (as others

believe) the underlying cultural differences are really so strong that this
will never happen.
Spencer, supra note 45, at 64-65.

'96See LINDA CARTER ET AL., supra note 156, at 111; ELLEN S. PODGOR & ROGER S. CLARK,

205 (2d ed. 2008). The full name of the
tribunal, used by almost no one, is the "International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed
in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991."
'9 7PODGOR, supra note 196, at 205.

'"See id at 205-28.
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compare those procedures, it suffices to consider one example from the ad hoc
tribunals-the ICTY-as well as the first permanent international criminal
tribunal, the International Criminal Court ('ICC').
i. The ICTY
An observer'9 at a trial before the ICTY would notice immediately the
combination of disparate elements that a traditionalist might consider
incompatible. Typically, three judges sit collegially. 200 The panel is selected from
the "permanent" judgeS201 and temporary ad litem judges appointed for a term of
years; all are professionals nominated by their countries and approved by the
General Assembly of the United Nations.202 There is no lay participation in the
judging, either by an independent jury or by use of lay judges.
The judges are free to ask witnesses questions, but the production of
witness evidence ordinarily takes the form of direct and cross-examination by the
prosecuting and defending counsel.203 Rule 85 of the ICTY's Rules of Procedure
and Evidence specifies that "each party is entitled to call witnesses and present
evidence."204 Defendants choose whether to testify, and opening statements and
closing arguments are permitted.205 Witnesses are placed under oath, and their
testimony is given in open court unless the interests of justice, security, or "public
order or morality" dictate otherwise.2 06
Rules of evidence not unfamiliar to an American trial lawyer are in place,
although hearsay evidence and other forms of evidence considered insufficiently
reliable for a jury may be considered and given an appropriate weight. 207 Even an
exclusionary rule exists; albeit one that is cast in the vague generalities typical of
19Observing the trial work of the ICTY is very easy, due to the video feeds of the
courtrooms available on-line at the tribunal's excellent website. See UNITED NATIONS:
INT'L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (ICTY), http://www.icty.org/
sid/10150 (last visited Aug. 24, 2010).
Within the past year, a virtual tour of the
courtroom has been added to the site, displaying the arrangement of the room.
2
oSee Election Process, UNITED NATIONS: INT'L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA (ICTY), at http://www.icty.org/sid/143 (last visited Aug. 24, 2010).
20 1

"Permanent" judges are elected for four-year terms, but may be re-elected. See id

20

2See id.

203

See INT'L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA R. OF PROC. & EVID. R. 85(B),
IT/32/Rev.43 ("Examination-in-chief, cross-examination, and re-examination shall be
allowed in each case. It shall be for the party calling a witness to examine such witness in
chief, but a Judge may at any stage put any question to the witness."); see also SAFFERLING,
supra note 18, at 218-19 (judges are not exclusively responsible for presentation of
evidence but have an ancillary responsibility to question).
204
1NT'L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA R. OF PROC. & EvID. R 85(A),
IT/32/Rev.43 [hereinafter ICTY R. OF PROC. & EvID.].
20 5

See id R. 84, 84 bis, 85(B), IT/32/Rev.43.

206See id R. 79.
207
See id. R. 3.
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European "exclusionary rules." 208 The burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, but a simple majority of the trial judges may
convict. 209
Apart from the absence of a jury and the somewhat more active
participation of the trial judges, an ICTY proceeding is not jarringly dissimilar to
the adversarial trial of an American or British court. It does have, however, a
distinctively non-adversarial, continental flavor that is even more evident in
practice than in the rules of form. For example, the panels of judges ("trial
chambers") may include judges from English-speaking, adversarial traditions,
sitting alongside colleagues from civil law, non-adversarial countries. Although
each judge on these mixed panels will follow the letter of the procedural rules,
each one is likely to approach judging in a noticeably different way. A German
judge, for instance, would be more likely to question witnesses actively and
exercise more control over the proceedings, while a Scottish judge might be
content to sit quietly and let the lawyers direct the flow of evidence. Panels in
which judges of one tradition dominate may handle the proceedings very
differently than those of another tradition, even though the evidence and the
lawyers are the same. A strong presiding judge can influence the tone of the trial,
and even rule on evidentiary and procedural matters in ways that reflect his or her
own legal background.
While trial proceedings are mostly open and oral, the nature of the crimes
being tried often requires that they be closed to the public. This might be done to
protect a witness from coercion or retaliation, or because testimony is considered
especially sensitive or embarrassing or revealing of confidential matters. Closing
parts of the trials to the public serves important interests, but it runs counter to the
legal training and experience of judges from countries with strong freeas
speech/open-trial cultures.21o An English judge could view other interests 21
1
prevailing over the need for transparency and public discussion of the trial,
while an American judge would defer more readily and expansively to the need
for justice done publicly. These differences threaten the goal of consistency
within a multinational tribunal. Consequently, trials conducted in the same "legal
language" will nevertheless have distinctive "accents" depending on the
composition of the chamber.
Another danger of multinational (or multi-traditional) judging is the
tendency to somewhat haphazard rule interpretation at the trial level. No
208

See id. R. 95 (stating that "[n]o evidence shall be admissible if obtained by methods
which cast substantial doubt on its reliability or if its admission is antithetical to, and would
seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings").
209
See ICTY R. OF PROC. & EVID. R. 87(A).
21
For a general discussion of open trials and the relationship between the media and the
justice process in Europe, see generally Marcel Lemonde, Justice and the Media, in
EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDUREs 688-715 (Mireille Delmas-Marty & J. R. Spencer eds.,
2002).
21
lSee id. at 692-97.
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procedure code is watertight; all have gaps that must be filled by interpretive rulemaking in the court of first instance. This "law in the interstices" is even more
likely to reflect the learned biases of the judges. At the extreme, this can produce
sufficiently disparate results that lawyers, defendants, and observers of the court
sense the tribunal is "making it up as it goes along." 212 These inconsistencies can
be corrected roughly and for the most part at the appeals level, but the appearance
of courts within the same tribunal handling trial issues in different ways
potentially undermines the confidence of the litigants and the public.
Setting aside the advantages and challenges of combining judges, the
ICTY demonstrates the first significant combination of procedural rules from
different traditions. The three-judge trial bench, functioning without the
possibility of lay participation, starkly contrasts, not only with the independent
jury model of the United States and Great Britain, but also with the mixed-bench
model of many western European countries. To the extent that the judges
question witnesses and exercise controls, the trial differs further from a strong
adversarial model.
On the other hand, there is considerable adversariness in the ICTY's trial
procedures. Lawyers bear the primary responsibility for calling witnesses and
examining them under rules of evidence that are more extensive than necessary in
most non-adversarial systems. Motions are made by the lawyers; they argue their
cases and control the order of evidence; and the burden of proof falls on the
prosecution and is identical to that used in England and the United States.
Notwithstanding the hybridization of procedural rules by the ICTY, it
seems quite successful in its role as a neutral, fair arbiter of conduct in a regional
conflict. 213 The use of video streaming via its website, simultaneous translation
into the official languages of the tribunal, published rules of procedure and
evidence, and professional, competent prosecution and judging-complete with
detailed "European-style" judgments-contribute to the claim that the ICTY has
achieved important goals that extend beyond accountability for crimes against
humanity.214
2 12

In fact, the permanent judges of the ICTY create the procedural rules and evidence rules.

See PODGOR, supra note 196, at 212-13. So, in a sense, the judges of the tribunal do "make

uP" the law of the court.
This view, obviously, will never be shared by all. See Eric A. Posner, Political Trials In
Domestic and InternationalLaw, 55 DUKE L.J. 75, 149 (2005) ("In the international setting,

international criminal tribunals will similarly look like efforts by the governments that
influence the prosecutor and judges-- whether the Security Council (in ad hoc cases) or the
members of the ICC--to harass or embarrass states with contrary foreign policy objectives.
The states whose nationals are being tried will always make this charge, however faithfully
the prosecutor and judges try to carry out their duties.").
214See PODGOR, supra note 196, at 214; THE INT'L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, BRINGING JUSTICE TO THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, THE TRIBUNAL'S FIVE CORE
at
a v a i I a b I e
ACHIEVEMENTS,
http://ulm.katholikentag.de/data/ktaktuell/manuskripte/3732.doc [hereinafter ICTY CORE
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ii. The ICC 215
In important respects, the ICTY has laid the groundwork for the ICC, the
first permanent international criminal court. 216 The ICTY experience includes
many of the same issues and complications that can be expected as the ICC begins
its work: political wrangling;217 cooperation-or lack thereof-among the affected
states and with the court;2'8 development of a body of "common law" and
interpretation from very general international standards; 219 and, of course, creation
of procedural rules that seek to accommodate a variety of differing notions of due
process.
Because the ICC was created through a treaty process, substantive rules
of law and rules of procedure and evidence were part of the founding document
(the "Rome Statute").220 To supplement the provisions of the Rome Statute,
separate rules of procedure and evidence have been adopted by the parties to the
treaty. 221 These rules augment and expand upon the more general articles of the
Rome Statute.222
As with the ICTY, the ICC's composition and processes reflect the

ACHIEVEMENTS].

21Because this article considers the procedural trends at work in the world today, I do not

describe the creation of the ICC, its purpose except in the most general terms-or the
substantive crimes subject to prosecution by the court. I also have focused for purpose of
comparison on the procedures involved in the trial of cases, rather than in their
investigation and appeal. The history of the negotiation of the Rome Statute and the
continuing efforts to shape this tribunal in its formative stages are most interesting, but are
outside the scope of this article.
216

See ICTY CORE ACHIEVEMENTS, supra note 214, at 8 (noting that the expertise

developed by ICTY has been shared with those involved with the ICC and Special Court
for Sierra Leone).
217
Professor Broomhall notes that, "The experience of the ad hoc tribunals has only
underscored the interplay between law and politics in the enforcement of international
criminal law." BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE & THE INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT 154 (Ian Brownlie eds. 2003).
218

Id. at 152-55 (explaining that the ICTY foreshadows experience that awaits ICC, states'
cooperation with ICTY has been uneven).
219
See id. at 162 (noting that the ICC undoubtedly will contribute to formal rule of law in
international criminal law).
220
The Rome Statute, creating the International Criminal Court, was adopted in 1998 and
entered into force on July 1, 2002 after being ratified by 60 countries. See INT'L CRIM. CT.,
A BOUT THE COURT, http://www.ice-cpi.intMenus/ICC/About%20the%2OCourt/ (last

visited Sept. 19, 2010).
221

See INT'L. CRIM. CT. R. PROC. & EVID., ICC-ASP/1/3 (2002), available at

http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/Legal+Texts+and+Tools/Official+Joumal/Rules+of+Procedure+and+E
vidence.htm.
222

See id.
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influences of its members. 223 While in some respects the ICC differs procedurally
from the ICTY, there are many similarities. Here again, three judges of the "Trial
Division" of the ICC sit as the "Trial Chamber" to hear cases.224 They conduct
the proceedings in such a way as to "ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and
is conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the
protection of victims and witnesses." 225 The court's role in simultaneously
conducting a criminal trial, and protecting, and sometimes compensating, crime
victims 226 is one more often seen in European legal systems than in that of the
United States. Given the nature of the offenses prosecuted in the ICC (genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression), it perhaps is not
surprising that special provision was made for victims.
Ordinarily, trials are held at The Hague, the seat of the ICC.m The trial
is public unless necessity dictates closing it,228 and a record of the proceedings is
22923
made.
Provision is made for a voluntary admission of guilt by the accused,230
raising the possibility of plea bargaining. The Statute makes clear, however, that
"any discussions between the Prosecutor and the defence regarding modification
of the charges, the admission of guilt or the penalty to be imposed shall not be
binding on the Court." 231 While this language establishes that the court, and not
the parties, bears responsibility for determining guilt and setting the punishment, it
does not preclude plea negotiation.232
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required for a conviction, and the
A list of rights enjoyed by
presumption of innocence is expressly established.
the accused is enumerated in Article 67. These include the right to be informed of
the nature of the charge;234 to obtain the advice of counsel and prepare a

the United States is not a party to the treaty, its role in forming the court
through negotiations leading to the Rome Statute, and following its adoption, is a
considerable one. For more information on the troubled relationship between the United
States and its negotiating partners, and the influence these debates had on policy, see
BROOMHALL, supranote 217, at 163-83 (2003).
224See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 39(2)(b)(ii), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 available at http://untreaty.un.org/codlicc/statute/romefra.htm (last
visited Sept. 19, 2010) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
225
223Although

2 26

See id. art. 64(2).

Restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation of victims may be ordered by the trial
chamber, even if the victims have not requested the remedy. See id art. 75.
227Id. art. 62.
228Id. art. 64(7).
229Id. art. 64(10).
230
Rome Statute, supra note 224, art. 65.
2 31
Id. art. 65(5)
2 32
The same limitation exists in the United States, a country in which most cases are
"settled" by plea bargaining.
233
Rome Statute, supra note 224, art. 66.
2 34
Id. art. 67(l)(a).
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defense; 235 to a speedy trial;236 to be present and have counsel appointed if the
defendant is indigent; 237 to examine and cross-examine witnesses and compel
attendance;238 and to have an appointed interpreter, if needed.239 The accused also
has the right not to testify, and not to have an inference of guilt drawn from the
invocation of the right to silence; 240 and to make an unswom statement in his or
241
Mitigating or exculpatory evidence in the possession of the
her defense.
disclosed to the defendant.242
be
prosecutor must
Witnesses must "give an undertaking as to the truthfulness" of their
244
It is the parties
testimony, 243 and generally are required to testify in person.
who submit evidence, 245 and the judges who rule on its admissibility.246 Rules of
privilege and judicial notice exist, 247 and a kind of exclusionary rule forbids
admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Rome Statute or
"internationally recognized human rights," but only if the violation makes the
evidence less reliable or "the admission of the evidence would
248 be antithetical to
and would seriously damage the integrity of the proceedings."
This elaboration of rights bears marked similarity to the guarantees found
in an American or British adversarial trial, but would also be familiar to
practitioners in a Continental non-adversarial system. Inclusion of the parties'
rights to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to present relevant evidence
and make closing statements,249 invests the process with an adversarial flavor. As
with the ICTY, however, control of the proceedings by a three-judge panel, and
without the participation of lay jurors or judges, provides a bit of comfort for
those who find the prospect of judging by "regular" people to be reckless. ICC
judges also have the right to examine witnesses, 25 0 and an active trial chamber
could change the feel of the process considerably in the direction of an

23

Id. art. 67(1)(b).
67(1)(c).

61d. art.

237.

art. 67(1)(d).

Statute, supra note 224, art. 67(1)(e).
Id. art. 67(1)(f).
240Id. art. 67(l)(g).
241Id. art. (1)(h).
238Rome
23 9

242Id. art.

243

67(2).

Rome Statute, supranote 224, art. 69(1).
24Id. art. 69(2).
24 5
1d. art. 69(3).
24Id. art. 69(4).
247Id. art. 69(5), (6).
248
Rome Statute, supra note 224, art. 69(7).
249
1NT'L. CRIM. CT. R. PROC. & EvID., ICC-ASP/l/3, R.142 (2002), available at
http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/Legal+Texts+and+Tools/Official+Journal/Rules+of+Procedure+and+E
vidence.htm.
25
oSee id. R. 140(2)(c).
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"inquisitorial" one.251
While the application of these rules may trend in either direction, it
seems likely that the ICC trial experience will be a kind of hybridized process
reminiscent of the ICTY. Even if this occurs, though, the ICC occupies a unique
position within worldwide criminal procedure. It is a permanent body, and
therefore unlike the ICTY, ICTR, Nuremberg tribunal, or any of the other ad hoc
courts. While it shares its supranational character with the United Nations, it
stands separate and apart from the U.N. Within the bounds of the express
authority conferred on it by the Rome Statute and the indulgence of its member
states, the ICC enjoys a rare freedom to develop its own procedural jurisprudence
and custom. As the most visible institution of its kind, independent from the
dictates of any particular nation, legal tradition or culture, the ICC constitutes an
ongoing experiment. As such, it may prompt nations considering procedural
reforms to follow its example. The more fundamental question, however, is
whether the ICC is itself merely a reflection of a much broader reform movement.
VI. WHY IS THIS HAPPENING?
All of these modifications of criminal procedure might be entirely
unconnected and coincidental, but if they are, it is surprising that such different
legal traditions have adopted so many common features. Instead, this movement
may reflect a growing consensus about the desirability of certain procedural
processes, or disenchantment with others, or both. Or, it may be prompted by the
examples of the ad hoc tribunalS 252 and those nations that engaged in reform
efforts relatively early. If the convergence is deliberate, is it motivated by a new
unified view of what criminal procedure should be? If so, where did that unified
view originate, and what is it? Is this convergent trend likely to continue, to
change direction, or to end?
Given the connectedness of the economies, peoples, and political
leadership of developed nations, it is impossible to believe that procedural
changes begin and grow in a vacuum. As the strong walls of legal sovereignty,
which had been left relatively intact by the world community, crumbled with the
creation of the World War II tribunals and the United Nations, invading notions of
"international norms" gained stronger footing in countries that previously had paid
little heed outside of diplomatic circles to what other nations were doing.
Whether the exchange of social and popular culture through television, instant
news, increased travel, or trade prompted the spread of legal culture or merely
25lSee SAFFERLING, supra note 18, at 220 (stating that judges are more than passive

"umpires" and closer to those of Continental systems).
2 52
See LUBAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 137 (noting that decisions of supranational criminal
courts "provide a growing source of analysis and guidance from which a universal code of
criminal procedure may one day emerge").
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expedited it, the impact of globalization must have played a significant part in
propagating reform. 253
Some have argued against the establishment of a universal system of
criminal procedure, 254 while others have promoted the idea. 255 Richard Vogler
describes his opposition:
The first principle I would like to propose is the abandonment of
the impractical dream of discovering the universal laws of
motion of criminal procedure through the application of
scientific method. This project, still very much alive in the
conferences of the Association Internationalede Droit Pinale

(AIDP), is linked to a Positivist agenda which has long been
discredited in most disciplines. It represents a yearning for the
creation of a universal code of criminal procedure which could
be applicable across the globe and which would enable us all to
coordinate our efforts in the collective defence against crime.
This ambition, which was central to the early scientific
endeavours of comparative criminal justice, is still exercising its
powerful fascination, most notably in the elegant and thoughtful
work of Delmas-Marty (2003).
It has encouraged the creation of pan-European
projects at the level of criminal justice, such as Corpus luris,
Eurojust and the office of the European Prosecutor. It has
developed a new impetus from the foundation of the
international tribunals which has renewed enthusiasm for the
elaboration of a truly universal procedure.256
It may well be that a universal approach to criminal procedure is a
Utopian dream we are incapable of achieving, and one that is not, in any case,
id. at 136 (stating that "one result of an increasingly interconnected world ... is a
clear trend toward harmonization, if not actual convergence, among the various legal
253See

systems around the world"); see also Linda S. Mullenix, American Exceptionalism and
Convergence Theory: Are We There Yet?, PAPERS OF THE INT'L Ass'N OF PROCEDURAL
available at
1, 1 (2009),
C ONFERENCE
LA w, 2009 TORONTO

http://www.iapl2009.org/documents/2aLindaMullenix_000.pdf

(last visited Sept. 19,

2010); Samuel P. Baumgartner, Civil Procedure Reform in Switzerland and the Role of
Legal Transplants, PAPERS OF THE INT'L Ass'N OF PROCEDURAL LAw, 2009 TORONTO
at
available
1
(2009)
1,
CONFERENCE

http://www.iapl2009.org/documents/2aSamuelBaumgartner.pdf (last visited Sept. 19 2010)
("[T]here is bound to be some convergence of rules and approaches across legal cultures as
various forms of international interaction increase.").
See VOGLER, supra note 61, at 277.

254

255

See, e.g., SAFFERLING, supra note 18.
OGLER, supranote 61, at 277.

25 6
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desirable. The mere existence of region-wide efforts like Corpus Juris, as Vogler
says, reflects the "yearning" for universality, but success or failure in the
implementation of these smaller-scale projects will portend the future of broader
ambitions. Assuming that historical, cultural, and political obstacles prove too
great to overcome in realizing a completely unified procedure, striving for that
goal may nevertheless reveal workable combinations previously considered
incompatible. 257 If one or several hybrid, adversarial/non-adversarial constructs
are seen to succeed in practice, that success will encourage further
experimentation and foster a greater willingness to consider new procedural
schemes. Partial success, as in the Italian reforms, will discourage some,
encourage others, and cause still more to proceed cautiously.
The ad hoc tribunals, especially the ICTY and ICTR, were brave
attempts to fashion a compromise procedure that would be essentially adversarial,
but with sufficient vestiges of a non-adversarial approach to allow participation
and acceptance by judges, defendants, victims, and attorneys from those
traditions. Despite the attractiveness of the adversarial model, or perhaps because
the model was championed by advisers and advocates in the English-speaking
world, modifications have been necessary to curb the abuses so prominently on
display in the trial of Slobodan Milosevic, a spectacle that lasted four years and
was incomplete at the time of his death.258 Creation of a procedural regime
without lay judging and including the possibility of pleading guilty may have
promised increased efficiency, but it was a promise unfulfilled. ICTY trials have
been lengthy, due in part to the unfamiliarity of civil law judges with the practical
workings of adversarial rules, 259 but also due to inherent inefficiencies in such a
257

Cf Mullenix, supra note 253, at 1 (stating that the convergence of American common
law and civil law systems may occur despite "peculiarly American resistance to theoretical
concepts or foreign norms" and because of "the U.S.'s ready embrace of pragmatism and
practical solutions").
sMarlise Simos & Alison Smal, Slobodan Milosevic, 64, Former Yugoslav Leader
Accused of War Crimes, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2006, at § 1, 34, col. 1, availableat
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/i/slobodan milosevic/index.
html; VOGLER, supra note 61, at 282-83.
259See VOGLER, supra note 61, at 281 (noting that ICTY trials typically last for a year). No
doubt, the nature of the crimes being tried in the ICTY hindered efforts at speedy
prosecution. Much of the oral testimony must be translated, and while this is done
simultaneously, corrections sometimes must be made and clarifications sought, all of which
contributes to delay. Much of the testimony revolves around persons and events
considerably removed in time from the actual trial, and that evidence is obscured by the
unavailability of records and witnesses, in addition to the loss of detailed memory. Events

under discussion occurred in a distant part of Europe, making it time-consuming to obtain
any supplementary materials or witnesses. To the extent that witnesses are reluctant, due to
fear of retribution or security concerns, the usual flow of testimony may be difficult to
achieve or sustain. Lawyers unskilled in direct and cross-examination experience more
difficulty eliciting testimony. All of these factors slow the adversarial trial process, a
process that is inherently cumbersome and inefficient.
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system of adjudication. Political considerations and a certain lack of cooperation
by affected states also have contributed to the slowness of the process. 260 These
influences are unlikely to be present in the reformed systems of individual nations,
although other obstacles to efficiency undoubtedly will remain. In the context of
the ad hoc tribunals, the inefficiencies of the adversarial model gradually resulted
in resort to more non-adversarial, inquisitorial modes of practice. 261 This
experience is mirrored in the Italian criminal procedure reforms designed to
introduce an adversarial characteristic into a traditionally inquisitorial system. As
with the ad hoc tribunals, the Italians have struggled to find ways to cope with the
inefficiencies of their reformed system.262
Adversarial trials are essentially an expression of preference for control
by the individual rather than the state.263 Given the history of the founding of the
United States, it is hardly surprising that the adversarial model flourished in this
country. The central government was not to be trusted; sturdy individualism, at
first a practical necessity, became the national ideal. Movement among legal
systems toward an adversarial view of adjudication may be a reflection of the
growth of individualism in other countries, or a concurrent disillusionment with
government-controlled systems regarded as inherently corrupt and suspect. If so,
is assured among
the continuing attractiveness of adversarial procedures
of the individual
the
expense
control
at
strong
government
in
which
countries
exists, and reform is likely to be accelerated by dissatisfaction with social or
economic conditions attributable to the political leadership or form of
government.
One may wonder why this impulse for a more active role in the criminal
justice system has not been widespread in the past. The answer lies in the vastly
26oSee VOGLER, supra note
261

61, at 280-81.

See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 387 (2003) (need to speed up
proceedings has been the "primary rationale" for change from adversariness to more
inquisitorial features); VOGLER, supra note 61, at 281-82 (explaining that various factors
led to significant "drift" away from the adversarial).
262See Van Cleave, supra note 87, at 304 (stating democratic reforms made trial "more
complicated and time-consuming").
263Richard Vogler notes, for example, that "the historic shift of European criminal justice
towards increased due process has been a natural and continuing tendency in a democratic
environment." CRIMINAL PROCEDURE INEUROPE, supra note 160, at 11. This is not to say,
of course, that adversarial processes are more likely to produce "due process." To the
extent that they vest more control in those they seek to judge, they will present a more
attractive alternative to justice dispensed exclusively by legal professionals and
representatives of the government.
2>he adversarial model continues to dominate the reform movement. CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE IN EUROPE, supra note 160, at 11 (stating adversarial methodology has
dominated ideologically during the last decades of the 20 century and the first years of the
present century). According to Richard Vogler, in continental Europe, the "drive towards
adversariality" has been "remorseless." Id. at 12. He notes that it also has spread through
diverse regions of the world. Id.
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increased access to information that only recently has been available. Not so long
ago, the legal doings of other nations were known primarily to the
"knowledgeable elite" of societies, and not to the ordinary citizens or even to most
lawyers and judges. American popular culture, complete with its images of trials
in which juries decide cases presented by lawyers working for their clients instead
of collaboratively, has spread ever more widely as Hollywood continues its love
affair with the exaggerated drama of the American courtroom. The average
American probably has never seen a foreign film or television program-even
with the advent of satellite channels-that depicts an inquisitorial criminal trial. If
an American does see a foreign trial, it is likely to be in a British film in which
wigged and robed advocates with accents play out a trial procedure already
familiar to the viewer. People in non-English-speaking countries, however, have
no trouble finding depictions of the adversarial trial, or at least a romanticized
version of it. 265 Precisely because it is a romanticized version, neatly concluded in
fifty minutes or less and in which justice virtually always is done even against
terrible odds, foreign lawmakers may be excused for turning to that model for its
attractive features, but without a full appreciation of its shortcomings.
For many of the same reasons, the jury system is well known and widely
admired. Would the average citizen prefer to be judged by a professional judge
who is a political appointee or government civil servant, or by a panel of likeminded citizens? The allure of a jury system is only enhanced by the opportunity
it presents to participate in some significant way in important decision-making.
The jury is a democratic institution precisely because it gives Everyman a
temporary role in the application of criminal justice; it makes the juror a judgefor-a-day.
Whatever its genesis, the movement toward increased use of adversarial
processes-and perhaps any significant movement-faces roadblocks that will be
very difficult to overcome in the short term, and may prove insurmountable. As
noted, the inefficiencies inherent in the system, the indirect and counter-intuitive
method of searching for the truth involved in a cumbersome direct and crossexamination system; the seeming relegation of truth-finding to secondary
importance, and the need for complex evidentiary rules to protect juries from
undue prejudice and unreliable evidence, all become apparent only after
adversarial procedures are adopted. Whether the challenges of operating under an
adversarial model outweigh the benefits of giving the affected parties a measure of
control remains to be seen, and that cost/benefit analysis undoubtedly will produce
variations in systems trying to adjust to a new method of adjudication, including

265

When I have taught in Austria, my Austrian students always are familiar with the
American style trial through television and movies. Most of them, though, have never seen
an Austrian criminal trial and have only a vague idea how it would look. It is ironic that an
American law professor would have viewed more Austrian criminal trials than a law
student from that country.
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total abandonment of the effort in some countries. 266
As a result of these experiments shifting toward adversariness, a kind of
composite hybrid model has emerged. It bears distinctive inquisitorial aspects: a
pre-trial investigative phase conducted by a separate magistrate or prosecutor
supervised by an investigating magistrate; an emphasis on truth-finding, including
broad disclosure or discovery measures; a significant degree of participation by
the trial judge, but with deference to the parties' rights to direct the proceedings;
some reliance on written forms of evidence, with more pre-trial disclosure to the
judge of evidence to be used at trial; and expansive review powers by appellate
courts.
Exclusionary rules may exist, but are subsidiary to the truth-finding
function. The lawyers' primary responsibility is to serve the ends of justice, rather
than trying to "win" an adversarial contest on behalf of their clients.
The composite sketch also would contain adversarial elements not
previously included in the inquisitorial model. Most visible is the significant
control the parties exercise over the trial, including introduction of evidence by
direct and cross-examination of witnesses they choose. Increasingly, but not in
the international tribunals,268 lay judges are being installed, sometimes even
independent, British-style juries, a distinctly democratizing reform measure. In an
effort to expedite the movement of cases through courts, various forms of
summary disposition, including plea bargaining, are allowed.269
Is it possible, or desirable, to seek to develop from this hybrid composite
model a universal method of criminal investigation and adjudication? 270 Clearly,
266See VOGLER, supra note 61, at 283 (2005) (noting that there was a "radical

strengthening" of inquisitorial features of ICTY proposed in wake of Milosevic
prosecution). Some adjustments of balance were made by the ICC, based on the experience
of the ICTY and ICTR. Essentially an adversarial trial procedure, the ICC model includes
compensating inquisitorial features. See CASSESE, supra note 261, at 387.
267See, e.g., CASSESE, supra note 261, at 386-87; VOGLER, supra note 61, at 282-83
(discussing adoption of inquisitorial procedures by ICTY).
268See SAFFERLING, supra note 18, at 216 (noting that the use of a jury in an international
criminal court is "entirely out of the question").
269This necessary component of adversarial procedures will prove especially unattractive to
many. Richard Vogler explains:
One of the most persistent critiques of the introduction of more

adversariality is that the emphasis on the trial encourages compensatory
moves towards the use of the guilty plea, plea bargaining and an
expedited pre-trial, in which outcomes are achieved by negotiation
between the parties rather than by hearing in open court.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE INEUROPE, supra note 160, at 14.
270

Christoph Safferling believes such a universal procedure is possible and can be derived
from widely accepted human rights norms. See generally SAFFERLING, supra note 18. His
proposed construct bears a marked resemblance to that adopted by the ICTY and ICC. Id.
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there are great advantages to be gained in achieving uniformity in crime-control
measures. And to a considerable degree, the intertwining of cultures in the
Information Age homogenizes popular national understandings and expectations
of what a justice system should be. However attractive it may be, the
implementation of a uniform system invariably meets the reality that has been
experienced in Italy and by the ICTY and ICTR, and can be expected in the
ICC. 271 Imagine how much more pronounced that challenge must be when
individual, sovereign states, e.g., China, attempt to align with a world model not
of their making, and ill-suited to their national legal ethos.
English is the current lingua franca, but there is no widespread
movement to replace local languages. The Euro has become a regional currency,
but even within the European Union, some members cling to their traditional bills
and coins. Most of the world uses metric measurements, but the United States and
others stubbornly refuse to cede the foot, yard, pound, and gallon. Adoption of a
universal language, currency, and system of measurement also would facilitate
trade and travel, but the costs in national pride, tradition, and political capital still
outweigh these benefits. In the same way, nations may adopt some reforms in
imitation of the Italians 272 or the international tribunals, but will not, and should
not, insist on a truly uniform, universal method of investigation and
adjudication. 273 To the extent that developed countries are reform-minded, they
seem to be considering-and often selecting from-the adversarial hybrid menu
that currently is in vogue. But their selections vary considerably, as does the
success they achieve in integrating the chosen reforms into their own firmly
at 366-79.
271That same reality may explain why the United States did not embrace the tenets
and
processes it created with the Nuremberg tribunals, but other nations did. See generally
Leila Nadya Sadat, The Nuremberg Paradox,58 AM. J. COMP. L. 151 (2010) (arguing that

the French readily accepted the "internationalization" of criminal law due to its
compatibility with their legal tradition, while the U.S. did not follow its own example
because it was inconsistent with American law, legal philosophy, and politics).
272
The Italian reforms have served as an example for the rest of Europe. See CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE IN EUROPE, supra note 160, at 13 (stating Italian reforms "watched with the
greatest interest by the rest of the continent).
273 Contra SAFFERLING, supra note 18, at 378-79 (2001):
False adherence to domestic legal cultures that emerged for certain
political and historical reasons helps no one. Instead, there must be a
profound rethinking of domestic legal systems with a look at the
necessities of such a young and sensitive legal order as international
criminal law. Certainly a case-to-case development as attempted by the
ICTY can be considered inevitable. Nevertheless, in order to avoid
embarrassment of states and individuals, this must take place within a
solid theoretical consensus.
Id.
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If China, Argentina, and Italy prefer adversarial
entrenched systems.27
procedures, they certainly will not take the same form, or be embraced with the
same enthusiasm in each of those countries.
Reform is not doomed to failure. An increased measure of consensus on
principles can be achieved, but as the Italian and ICTY examples have shown,
real and practical reform requires patience and persistence, and a willingness to
adjust the reform measures when time and experience reveal incompatibilities.
Important benefits can be realized in the effort to find common ground, but that
good must not be sacrificed in the quest for the perfect. Transplantation is a tricky
business in law, as in other human organs.

274Richard Vogler noted the same limitations while arguing that universality is a notion

based on false positivist premises:
[W]hilst the new international regimes of criminal justice are to be
welcomed and whilst the underlying traditions of criminal justice are
truly universal, it remains a matter for each nation to develop its own
particular regime in accordance with local traditions and bearing in
mind the guiding principles of procedure.
VOGLER, supra note

61, at 285.

